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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COLOMBIA
Colombia is the only country in Latin America that has a severe problem of mine and ERW
contamination, due to an ongoing conflict that has lasted over 40 years. Mines continue to be
used and there are active minefields, many of the mines are of local fabrication. About 60%
of municipalities nationwide are affected and there are about 350 civilian casualties annually,
with a further 650 combat casualties from mines and IED. The issue of mines and mine action
in Colombia is deeply politicised, the government regards the ongoing conflict as a terrorist
threat.
Colombia has between 2 and 4 million Internally Displaced Persons due to the conflict.
Colombia is a middle income country with a population of about 44 million.
A systematic survey of mine impact has been proposed but not yet implemented; the EC
intends to fund such a survey in 2008 but whether this is feasible during active conflict
remains to be seen.
Colombia has signed and ratified the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention, has identified
mine action as a national priority which is included in national planning, and has funded part
of the costs of the national mine action centre. The national health system has provision for
assisting mine victims, though there are significant practical obstacles to access at present,
including understanding of health rights, and physical access as 97% of mine accidents take
place in rural areas. Some mine victims are reported as being unwilling to come forward due
to fear of reprisals – either from being seen as part of the forces using mines and injured while
mine-laying, or from being seen as attempting to remove mines and therefore a target for
those on the other side protecting their minefields. The EC Country Strategy Papers for 20026 and 2007-13 both include mine action.
Demining in Colombia is a monopoly of the armed forces, who have been trained in
humanitarian demining techniques by programmes coordinated by the Organization of
American States, funded by humanitarian donor aid. Substantial resources have been spent in
training military deminers who also undertake “Humanitarian demining for humanitarian
emergencies” - this does not fall within a standard definition of humanitarian demining as it is
mine clearance for populations in zones where combat may be on-going. For security reasons
exact locations of mined and cleared areas are usually not released and details of any quality
management are not available.
MRE activities in Colombia are fragmented with at least 20 different organisations active.
There is still significant unmet need for MRE especially in remote areas and for the millions
of displaced persons. Current activities include both the OAS approach of uniformed military
personnel giving lectures and the Community Liaison based long-term approach supported by
UNICEF and a number of NGOs.
A large number of donors have funded Mine Action in Colombia, the EC is prominent among
them with a total of over 4.5 million euros since 2002. This is about 60% of all EC mine
action funding for Latin America , which is entirely proportional to the relative scale of the
problem but it forms less than 2% of the total EC assistance to development in Colombia
which includes very substantial projects in support of displaced persons, and in support of
large scale peace-building projects. Two and a half million euros of the EC contribution have
been assigned to support the development of national mine action structures and the proposed
survey. The total funding for the national mine action centre, including major contributions
from the national government, has been about 6 million US dollars (4 million euros at current
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exchange rates). The results have been disappointing to date with the national mine action
centre still heavily reliant on external advice.
The impact of the new Instruments for Cooperation of the EC has been somewhat negative.
EC Delegation staff reported difficulty in finding a mechanism to undertake advance planning
of mine action in order to have a strategic plan ready to support any positive moves in the
currently blocked peace process. A rapid positive response to breaking the deadlock would
be in line with EC policy. The inclusion of mine action in the Country Strategy Papers
mitigates any changes to financing. However, even though Colombia has more mine action
projects than other countries in Latin America, the staff member responsible reported
significant problems of isolation – in particular a lack of contact with colleagues working on
mine action in other countries of the region, and a lack of training opportunities and
supporting documentation.
There is limited room for manoeuvre for the EC in planning any further mine action in
Colombia. There are restrictions on scope of activities, due to (i) the ongoing conflict, (ii)
severe problems with personal security in some areas, (iii) the monopoly on mine clearance
by the military, and (iv) the already substantial support for national capacity building from
both the national government and donors. MRE and VA appear to be the only two suitable
areas for future funding.
The report identifies the EC contribution as:
• Relevant, given the constraints.
• Somewhat weak so far on effectiveness and efficiency due to the limited success of
the substantial capacity building effort for the national mine action centre. This is the
only major project sufficiently advanced to evaluate at this stage. Improved
effectiveness and efficiency are anticipated for the other major projects.
• Having a disappointing impact. This is due to (i) the significant constraints which
apply in Colombia due to the conflict, (ii) the results of the fragmentation and
isolation of mine action implementation by the EC, and (iii) other factors such as the
extremely high level of politicisation of mine action in Colombia.
• Having good sustainability, based on substantial national funding for mine action and
the potential for Victim Assistance through the national health service.
• The report ends with recommendations, of which the most important are to decrease
isolation by improved communication between EC staff and to consider further
limited support for mine risk education and victim assistance only – further “train and
equip” programmes for deminers cannot be recommended.
PERU
Peru has two separate mine and other ERW contamination problems inside its territory, and is
also affected by the border minefields laid by Chile on the Chilean side of the border. Peru is
a large (slightly larger than Angola) lower-middle income country with a population of about
29 million.
Peru has been a state party to the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention since 1998 and has in
place national structures for mine action, including a national mine action plan and a national
coordination organisation CONTRAMINAS, which is overseen by six government ministries.
The Organization of American States has a parallel structure with close links to the military
demining staff and coordination links to CONTRAMINAS. There has not been a national
impact survey, nor a survey of victims of mine accidents.
One of the mine problems is contamination on the Peru-Ecuador border due to the brief but
intense border war in 1995. This is a remote mountainous region, that is difficult to access,
and part of which is uninhabited. Clearance is undertaken by the military forces of both
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countries as part of a joint project organised through the Organization of American States
(OAS). The overall strategic goal of the project is to reinforce the peace process between the
two countries.
The other mine problem is due to the protective mining of electric pylons (high voltage
transmission line towers) and some other key infrastructure from 1989 onwards, during the
internal armed conflict with the Shining Path and Tupac Amaru armed revolutionary
movements. About 1,700 towers were mined. Clearance is the responsibility of special
police units, and – unusually for Latin America - is being financed by the privatised electricity
companies.
The military clearance in the Ecuador border area has proceeded very slowly and at high cost.
The results are reported as very positive in terms of peace building but the mine clearance has
cost overall around 200 US dollars per square metre and is far behind schedule.
The police clearance teams, on the other hand, have worked very quickly and at low cost, but
without sufficient training, equipment or supervision. The result has been a large number of
casualties (about 80) and the need to repeat clearance up to three times. The Peruvian victims
association AVISCAM was formed by former police deminers injured during clearance
operations.
Currently there are roughly 10 civilian casualties each year, the overwhelming majority from
ERW associated with the pylons; the border minefield has little impact.
The EC Country Strategy Papers (CSP) for 2002-2006 and 2007-2013 include the border
demining, and the latter one also includes demining in a broader context.
The EC has supported the Peru-Ecuador border clearance with 1 million euros, donated
through the OAS in 2006. While the impact on peace consolidation has been more than
satisfactory, the cost efficiency of the OAS structures (which charge over 50% for
“supervision and administration”) and of the overall demining process (which cleared only
197 mines out of a projected total of 1,500) are open to question.
There are no other mine action projects supported by the EC in Peru, so the effects of
fragmentation of EC mine action resources, and isolation of EC staff working with mine
action, are clear. EC staff cannot afford the time and resources to become experts in mine
action for a single project – this is evidenced by minor errors in the CSP. Improved
information resources, improved access to technical expertise, and improved communications
within the EC between staff in different countries with limited numbers of mine action
projects - in order to share experiences - are urgently needed.
Evaluation criteria:
• Relevance was considered as good as the project addressed both peace building and
mine clearance. The lost opportunity to work with the police demining programme
could be considered as reducing the overall relevance of the programme.
• Effectiveness: In terms of the peace process the programme outcome was highly
effective. In terms of demining it was ineffective.
• Efficiency: It is difficult to quantify efficiency of support to consolidating the peace
process, especially in the absence of clear and objectively verifiable programme
goals. The efficiency of the demining programme was extremely low, even taking
into account the very difficult terrain.
• Impact: The same remarks as efficiency apply.
• Sustainability: Once again this is mixed. There are some very good and sustainable
results in the peace process. The demining is heavily dependent on donor aid and
completely unsustainable.
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The report ends with recommendations. The most important are:
- to take measures to reduce the isolation of EC staff dealing with mine action and to
increase the use of technical expertise;
- to consider long term support for police deminers as a permanent national capacity to
deal with residual threat, and
- to not consider further support for the border clearance. If, for political reasons, and
in support of the peace process, further border demining is contemplated, then it
should be supported by a very much more rigorous contractual regime including
technical evaluation, use of EC procedures such as Project Cycle Management, a
significant reduction in overhead costs, and payment on the basis of demining work in
the contract being completed.
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1. REPORT ON THE MISSION TO COLOMBIA
INTRODUCTION
This report provides the findings from a field visit to Colombia in support of a broader
regional evaluation of EC-funded mine action in Latin America, the focus of which is on
policy, strategy, and programming. The Terms of Reference (ToR) are appended as Annex A
of the overall report.
This Colombia component of the regional evaluation is based on the findings of a mission by
Russell Gasser 1 to Bogota in December 2007, further interviews by e-mail and phone,
coupled with a review of documents.
PF

FP

BACKGROUND
Colombia is the fifth largest country in Latin America 2 (29th largest in the world). With an
area of about 1 million sq km it is slightly larger than Egypt and 23% of the total size of the
EU27. The population is estimated at 44 million. The Human Development Index 3 places
Colombia at 75th in world rank order, a similar level to its neighbours Peru and Ecuador.
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 4 places Colombia in 68th rank
order, slightly ahead of its neighbours. While Colombia is a middle income country, very
close to the global average per capita (purchasing power corrected), there are striking
differences between rich and poor; the country’s Gini coefficient 5 (disparity of income) is
over 0.50. About 15% of the population lives in extreme poverty and a further 30% in
poverty. There is a very substantial gulf between rural and urban populations in all the
indices of health, wealth and welfare.
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P
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Colombia has a very severe problem with internally displaced persons due to the continuing
armed conflict in the country. The number of displaced persons was reported in 2007 to be
second in magnitude of any country, after Sudan. Colombian Government figures suggest
that in recent years about 200,000 persons per year have been displaced and the total is about
2 million. Independent estimates 6 put the annual rate higher and the total about 4 million.
PF

FP

Colombia is ethnically diverse. Geographically, it is made up of two major physical regions:
the Andes mountains, with large valleys in the west; and the broad lowlands, which extend
over almost two-thirds of the country in the east and form part of the Amazon rainforest. The
population is concentrated in the valleys and basins of the mountain region, while the
lowlands are sparsely inhabited.
The issue of mines and mine action in Colombia is deeply politicised as is the language used
to describe the situation; words must be chosen with care. The terms “armed conflict” and
“internal conflict” are not accepted by many on the government side, who have preferred
“guerilla violence,” “insurgency” and more recently “terrorist threat.” United Nations (UN)
agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) generally use the term
“armed conflict” which will be used in this report.

1 Russell Gasser is an independent consultant working for Humanitarian Technology Consulting Limited.
2 Some sources state: fourth largest.
3 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
4 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007
5 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2172.html Worldwide, Gini coefficients
range from 0.23 in Sweden to 0.71 in Namibia.
6 http://www.internal-displacement.org
H

H

H

H

H

H

H

H

EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN LATIN AMERICA
VERSION 8/4/2008 | 1

Figure 1 – Relief map of Colombia from Wikipedia

ORIGIN AND EXTENT OF THE CONTAMINATION
Colombia has very widespread contamination with mines (both manufactured and improvised
mines), improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and some other Explosive Remnants of War
(ERW) 7 . As the dominant mine problem is due to ongoing active conflict and mines are still
being emplaced, the “residual problem” will not be reported separately from the origin and
extent.
TPF

FPT

There are essentially two different mine problems: a relatively small number of mines laid by
government forces as protective barriers around military bases, most of which are marked and
fenced, and numerous mines laid by non-state actors (NSAs) as part of the continuing armed
conflict.

7 ERW includes unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance (AXO) as well as mines. Improvised
mines are a sub-set of IEDs which are victim operated, IEDs can also be command detonated (this definition is
based on the MBT definition of mines being victim operated).
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BARRIER MINEFIELDS AROUND MILITARY BASES
The total figure originally reported in 1997 was about 20,000 mines in 34 mined areas around
current and former military bases. By 2007, after only small amounts of clearance, and some
land released through technical survey, the figure was adjusted downwards to 3,280
government mines in 18 minefields covering 209,622 sq m (21 hectares). 8 Most of these
areas are reported as being marked and many fenced. The Colombian army has made a start
on removing the barrier mines around bases in zones that are completely controlled by the
government. The land to be cleared around two of the bases will reportedly be sold by the
army for civilian use. 9
PF

PF

FP

FP

ACTIVE AND ABANDONED MINED AREAS IN CONFLICT ZONES
The conflict between the Government and armed revolutionary movements has been active
for over 40 years and is still on-going. Right-wing paramilitary forces have also played an
important role and in some of the most mine-affected regions the local population is trapped
between opposing armed factions and also suffers the risk of mine accidents. Mines are used
for conventional military purposes and also to control and terrorise the population and lock
them in to inaccessible locations.
On the government side of the conflict are the armed forces of Colombia, which have
received very substantial support from the USA 10 . The principal non-state parties to the
combat are the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the ELN (National
Liberation Army). Formerly, during the 1990s, there were also legally constituted
CONVIVIR self-defense and intelligence gathering groups, and until recently there were also
paramilitaries regarded as having close links to the army, the United Self-defense Forces of
Colombia, AUC. This loose federation of regional paramilitary groups is now illegal and was
officially demobilized from late 2003 to 2006, though there are credible reports that some
paramilitary members are continuing to use armed violence including the use of mines. This
is disputed by other sources. FARC, ELN and AUC are currently classified by many
countries including the USA, and the EC, as terrorist organisations. Use of mines by the
FARC has increased since the year 2000 11 . The FARC have consistently maintained a
position that mines are a legitimate defensive weapon which are not used near civilian
populations.
PF

PF
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Mines are also used by the illegal narcotics trade, to protect transport routes, drug processing
factories and plantations. There is evidence of links between some of the drug cartels and
various armed factions.
Two characteristics of Colombia’s mine problem are unique in Latin America: it is extremely
widespread throughout the country, and the use of mines has continued and even increased in
the last ten years. All of Colombia’s 31 mainland provinces are currently considered to be
affected by mines and UXO – but the degree of impact varies enormously. Contamination is
widespread with 669 municipalities out of a total of 1,098 (60%) reporting at least one
suspected hazardous area (SHA) or mine/IED related incident, and the OAS states that “40%
of the national territory” is affected. 12 Ninety-seven percent of reported mine affected
locations are in rural areas.
PF

FP

8 Figures as reported in Landmine Monitor.
9 This raises the issue of humanitarian aid being used to train and equip military deminers who then clear land
which is sold and the income retained by the army. In the highly politicized context in Colombia this could set a
precedent of the EC being perceived as funding the army (albeit indirectly) which could have significant political
consequences for other EC projects such as the “LABORATORIOS DE PAZ”
10 In the last six years this has typically been about 600 million USA dollars per year support for the police and
army, in training, equipment and advisors. See http://www.ciponline.org/facts/co.htm
11 http://hrw.org/reports/2007/colombia0707/3.htm
12 OAS “National Mine Action Profile - Colombia” available on www.aicma.oas.org
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The conflict remains very fluid and communities which until recently were little affected can
find themselves in a “hot” conflict zone quite suddenly. Equally, some zones move from
intense active combat to relative calm.
Many of the mines used by armed non-state actors are improvised or manufactured in remote
small scale “factories” from available materials, and the distinction between mines and IEDs
is not always clear. Also, the Colombian military continues to use Claymore mines on the
basis that these do not contravene the APMBC when used in command-detonated mode,
though the Landmine Monitor state that proof of conversion to command detonation only has
not been given.
In many areas, mines are located in still active minefields guarded by armed forces. The
author heard that there are areas controlled by the army in the daytime and by armed non-state
actors at night. The US Council on Foreign Relations stated: “Colombia’s government has
little control of any territory outside the country’s major cities.” Passing on information about
the location of mines, even for the purposes of MRE, is a very delicate issue and informing
any representative of the government, including the mine action programme, could be enough
to cause fatal reprisals in some areas. This will be discussed in more detail later in the report.
Figure 2 – FARC: armed actions in the times of President Pastrana (1999-2002) and the
first term of President Uribe (2003-2006). From Wikipedia. The unaffected areas in the
east are largely rainforest with few inhabitants.
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Figure 3 – Map showing where military demining has taken place in Colombia from
1990 to 2007. Red diamonds show military demining sites (not humanitarian demining
sites). This gives a good idea of the extent of mine contamination in the country.
From Programa Presidencial Para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal.

REPORTED CASUALTIES
Casualty data in Colombia comes from a number of sources, none of which is complete.
Press reports, based on communiqués from the army are one common source but cannot be
regarded as independent.
The Columbian Campaign Against Landmines, CCCM, and the government mine action
programme, PPAICMA, have taken the position in recent years that Colombia has more mine
casualties than any other country. This is based on aggregating military combat and police
casualties from active duty, with civilian casualties. Such an approach is open to question, as
is the standpoint of using military combat casualties to imply mine impact to the civilian
population. It would be particularly unfortunate if this reporting by Colombia were to trigger
a retroactive re-assessment by other countries, and the adjustment of their casualty data
upwards to include armed forces mine casualties during combat (for example Vietnam or
Yemen would be able to increase their total casualties very substantially.) Some non-civilian
casualties, such as local police officers in vehicles travelling on normal business, should
probably be included but combat casualties have been excluded from the overall figure by
other countries and there appears to be no case to Colombia to be an exception despite the
reasonable desire of the national authorities to draw attention to the problem.
It is likely that this approach reflects the deep politicisation of mine action in Colombia, on
the government side there is little official distinction between civilian casualties and casualties
among the armed forces engaged in combat to defend the country against a perceived terrorist
threat.
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Detailed analysis of the real impact of mines on the civilian population in Colombia is
difficult and will remain so until a systematic survey is conducted. At present a survey is not
possible – the conflict remains active and the situation is fluid, and there would be extreme
risk to both the surveyors, and anyone who provided them with information, in many areas.
Despite the very large number of displaced people in Colombia, and the known relationship
between IDPs and an increase in mine casualties in a number of other countries, there appears
to be no attempt to relate these two factors in Colombia.
By any measure, Colombia has a very severe mine problem. Colombia is one of a small
number of countries which has hundreds of civilian casualties from mines and ERW each year
(see table below).
Table 1 – Civilian casualties in the three countries with largest number of reported
civilian mine victims 2006. Data from Landmine Monitor.

Country

Dead

Injured

Total

Afghanistan

90

12%

655

88%

745

Cambodia

66

15%

382

85%

448

Colombia

57

18%

257

82%

314

Table 2 – Civilian mine and UXO casualties in Colombia, according to data from
Landmine Monitor. Blanks in the table indicate no published data.

Year

2006

Killed

57

Injured

Total

257

Caused by
mines and
improvised
mines

Caused by
UXO

314

250

64

2005

338

313

25

2004

239

2003

195

2002

271

1900 2001

Approx
500

As is the case in many countries, most mine accidents take place in remote locations and there
is widespread agreement that casualty figures are under-reported. In Colombia there also
appear to be strong incentives in some areas to not report mine accidents: there are reliable
reports of abduction of mine victims on the basis that forces opposed to the armed factions
using the mines assume victims were injured either while fabricating and placing mines, or
that forces using the mines assume the victim was injured while attempting to remove mines.
The ICRC reported this risk in 2004 13 and UNICEF staff confirmed that it is still prevalent.
PF

FP

13 ICRC Special Report, Mine Action 2004, page 35.
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HISTORY OF MINE ACTION
Colombia signed the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in 1997, and later
ratified it in 2000. It is frequently asserted that there is “no known use of mines by the
Colombian Armed Forces since the ban was signed”, however a United Nations report
released in February 2003 contains a serious allegation of use of antipersonnel landmines by
the Colombian Army. The Colombian government has indicated only command-detonated
Claymore mines, permissible under the APMBC, were used. 14
F

F

Colombia is a former producer of antipersonnel landmines but ceased production in 1999.
Production of a directional fragmentation munition (Claymore-type) continues and Colombia
has not reported measures taken to prevent the use of this device as an AP mine by attaching
victim-operated fuzing systems.
In 1997, Law 418 established the obligation of the state to care for victims of armed political
or ideological conflict within the exisiting health care system. In 1992, the President’s Office
created a fund to guarantee 8 million Colombia pesos (approximately US$4,000 in 2008) to
victims of violence. However, these laws include some time limits for requesting assistance,
and there is widespread ignorance of their provisions and the right to claim assistance in rural
areas. This is currently being addressed in a number of advocacy projects.
The Government identified mine action as a priority in 2001, and included it in the 2002-2006
Development Plan, in the Project Bank of the National Planning Department, and in the 2004
Investment Project of the Administrative Department of the President of the Republic.
In 2001 the government established a commission (CINAMA) to coordinate mine action, and
the key component of this, the government’s Antipersonnel Mine Observatory 15 became
operational. The Commission includes representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Relations,
National Defence, Health, and Interior, as well as from the National Planning Department. It is
organised with an Executive Secretary under the Presidential Program for the Promotion,
Respect and Guarantee of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law and is the
responsibility of the Vice President. The Commission is also composed of two technical
subcommittees, the Intersectorial Committee for the Prevention and Care of Victims and the
Intersectorial Committee for Marking, Mapping, and Demining. The general direction,
coordination, execution and monitoring of activities related to mine action is carried out by the
Observatory, under the supervision of the Vice President; the Observatory has the role of a
standard national mine action centre including maintaining the databse on IMSMA.
However, despite the formal position, demining is firmly in the control of the army and not
the Observatory.
PF

FP

A national mine action plan has been developed and regularly updated. According to Law
848 of November 2003 and Decree No. 3787 of December 2003, the Anti-Personnel
Landmine Observatory was assigned the amount of 2,500 million Colombian pesos, about US
$1 million, of national funding.
The Colombian Campaign Against Landmines (Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas, CCCM)
has been active in promoting the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention and in mine action in
the country since 1996 and currently has representatives in 22 of the 31 mine affected
provinces.

14 Reported in Landmine Monitor 2003.
15 This is the usual translation from “Observatorio de Minas AP” but “APL Monitoring Office” would be better.
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In May 2001 the Colombian Government asked the United Nation Mine Action Service
(UNMAS) for an exploratory mission. This led to the inclusion of Colombia in the UNMAS
portfolio of LOIS (Level One Impact Survey) in the 2001-2005 UN mine strategy. The need
for a systematic evaluation of mine impact in Colombia was recognised by the VicePresident’s Office in 2001. 16 The need for a survey has been re-emphasised many times
since, including by the EC. The Survey Action Centre has carried out a Preliminary Opinion
Collection but concluded that a full Landmine Impact Survey in accordance with international
protocols is not feasible. The EC intends to finance some survey activities later this year
(2008). Survey work is made difficult by the active combat in some mine affected areas;
there are also very significant concerns that attempting to identify the location of active
mined areas could lead to reprisals not only against the survey teams but also against any
local people who they speak to.
PF

FP

The organisation Geneva Call has been involved in working with non-state actors in
Colombia since 2003 to try to bring about the end of the use of AP landmines by these
groups. There has been no breakthrough, but agreement on some limited demining and
improved marking of some mined areas was achieved. The EC funded part of the Geneva
Call initiative.
The Organisation of American States humanitarian demining coordination programme
became actively involved in Colombia in 2005 - the focus of the OAS programme is training
and equipping military personnel as humanitarian deminers. The OAS-AICMA is a
coordination, standards and management structure which relies on multilateral donations,
similar to the role of UNDP in some other countries, however it is based on a military model
and only trains armed forces, or occasionally special police or civil protection units, to
demine. The training is usually by US military personnel.
In 2007 the Observatory was superceded - its mandate remained essentially the same but its
status was upgraded and it is now known as the Presidential Programme for Integrated Action
against AP Landmines, PPAICMA. It is still located within the office of the Vice President.

16 Reported in Landmine Monitor 2001.
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NATIONAL MINE ACTION STRUCTURES
Figure 4 – A diagram of the mine action structures in Colombia, from the OAS AICMA website
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MINE CLEARANCE
Demining in Colombia is a monopoly of the armed forces, who have been trained in
humanitarian demining techniques by programmes coordinated by the OAS, funded by
humanitarian donor aid. Reports vary, but it seems that 40 humanitarian deminers were
initially trained and a further 40 have since been added to the total. Some reports state the
total is now 140 humanitarian deminers. Substantial resources have also been spent in
training military deminers who also undertake “Humanitarian demining for humanitarian
emergencies,” although it is unlikely that this would fall within a standard definition of
humanitarian demining as it is mine clearance for populations in zones where combat may be
EVALUATION OF EC-FUNDED MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES IN LATIN AMERICA
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on-going. For security reasons exact locations of mined and cleared areas are usually not
released and details of any quality management are not available. This type of demining,
undertaken by serving military personnel as humanitarian assistance to the local population in
a conflict zone, appears to be the most common. For example, the 2003 national action plan
allocated nearly 80% of mine action resources to this clearance, USA$11 million for 2003 to
2006. According to Colombia’s April 2003 MBT Article 7 report, the Army’s “Grupo
Martes” had cleared 1,054 minefields in the past two years. It also trained 877 demining
experts at the Military Engineers School in 2002, and another 177 between January and
March 2003. According to media reports, the Army also has 450 mine detection dogs from
the Canine Training School in Bucaramanga; during the first nine months of 2002, the dogs
reportedly discovered 480 minefields, permitting the destruction of approximately 5,000
mines. 17 These activities appear to have only limited coodination with the national mine
action centre, Presidential Programme for Integral Action against Anti-Personnel Landmines
PPAICMA. However, they do represent a very substantial national capacity.
PF
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The total mined area which could be cleared according to verifiable humanitarian clearance at
present is comprised of former defensive mine rows around military bases in areas that are
firmly under government control. This is reported as about 21 hectares. With a currently
reported capacity of 80 exclusively humanitarian deminers there appears to be no reason that
these areas cannot be cleared very quickly (typical manual clearance rates world wide are
about one to two hectares per deminer per year) 18 . However, clearance rates in Colombia
have been very much lower than this, a total of less than 0.6 hectares was reported as cleared
to humanitarian standards in 2006 and less than half a hectare in 2005. 19
PF
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MINE RISK EDUCATION
MRE activities in Colombia are fragmented and variable, and currently increasing. There is
still significant unmet need for MRE especially in remote areas and for the millions of
displaced persons. Current activities include both the OAS approach of uniformed military
personnel giving lectures and the Community Liaison based long-term approach supported by
UNICEF and a number of NGOs. Coordination is by the PPAICMA (former Mines
Observatory) who are still building capacity and experience; the programme currently seeks
input from experienced organisations like UNICEF as it learns. Until 2007 there was an
emphasis by the Observatory on high profile media actions as a way to communicate MRE
messages, and nationwide publicity was achieved by top music stars being recruited to the
campaign. In the last year a move towards a more community-based approach has started.
There is a strong presence in Community Liaison by the Colombian Campaign Against
Landmines (CCCM)who have representatives in 22 departments.
Both the CCCM and UNICEF, as well as the Catholic church’s Pastoral Social 20 (roughly
equivalent to CARITAS) have chosen a long-term Community Liaison approach and all three
strongly emphasised the potential risk in some zones to local people who participate in MRE
activities, or especially anyone who provides information about the mine threat in their
communities. A long period of building confidence and learning about the realities of the
situation from the point of view of local people, is advocated by these organisations.
PF

FP

17 Reported in Landmine Monitor 2003.
18 Data from A study of manual mine clearance, book 5, published by GICHD, available from
http://www.gichd.ch
19 Reported in Landmine Monitor 2007.
20 The Pastoral Social is probably the only humanitarian organization present in all areas of the country. It
maintains a strictly neutral position and declines to associate itself with either government or non-state actor
positions. The church is widely respected by all groups in the armed conflict.
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A partial list of MRE actors in Colombia includes:
UNICEF; OAS programmes; the government’s Antipersonnel Mine Observatory and now
Presidential Programme for Integral Action against Anti-Personnel Landmines; UNHCR;
Colombian Red Cross; the Governor’s Bureaus (Gobernancias) of the departments of
Antioquia, Santander, Cauca, and Bolívar; the Health Sector Directorate; Government
Secretariat; the Education Secretariat; Mayoralties in selected municipalities; NGOs such as
Corporación Paz y Democracia, CCCM, FUNDEMOS; and the social services organisation of
the Catholic Church: Pastoral Social.
There are real risks of different messages, methods and strategies resulting in confusion rather
than behaviour change, especially where programmes overlap. Increasing the coordination
and possibly the regulation of MRE is an urgent task, but one that is currently very difficult to
achieve for two reasons. First, the PPAICMA is still gaining experience. Secondly,
organisations that maintain a strictly neutral position in the conflict cannot be seen to be too
closely invovled with initiatives of the Presidential Programme – the influential Pastoral
Social of the Catholic church, perhaps the only social organisation with true coverage
throughout all parts of Colombia, declines on principle to participate in programmes funded
through PPAICMA in order to preserve its strictly neutral status. The EC has recently
initiated a substantial MRE programme with co-funding of 2 million euros.
VICTIM ASSISTANCE
Colombia is unique amongst the most seriously mine affected countries in having a national
health care system with a mandate and possibly enough resources to treat mine victims, and
also in offering victims state compensation (up to US$ 4,000 at 2008 exchange rates). There
remain some serious problems in health care delivery - both in terms of emergency trauma
care and also in rehabilitation. Facilities are based in large towns and cities and 97% of mine
accidents occur in the countryside, often in remote areas. Transporting mine victims after an
accident can be extremely difficult and require immediate payments well beyond the means of
a substantial part of the rural population.
There is still a lack of a census of mine victims and survivors at national level and the
Presidential Programme for Integral Action against Anti-Personnel Landmines has expressed
an interest in completing a census as soon as possible in order to have a better understanding
of the situation. How this could be achieved is not clear.
The OAS programme has taken the same approach in Colombia as in other countries by
focussing on supplying prostheses or wheelchairs, plus rehabilitation to a limited number of
identified mine survivors. The Centre for Integral rehabilitation in Colombia, CIREC, has
been active in this field for at least ten years and its “Semillas de Esperanza” (Seeds of Hope)
programme 21 has received international recognition from the ICRC and others. For the few
mine victims able to get to the capital, and who receive assistance through this programme,
the support and services are of a high quality.
PF
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FUNDING FOR MINE ACTION
It is difficult to arrive at an exact figure for overall contributions to mine action in Colombia.
The principal causes are:
(i)

A relatively large number of donors supporting projects 22 - which include
some small mine action components of larger projects, and there is no single
PF

FP

21 For more information see the Semillas de Esperanza website at http://cirec.org/
22 An example is the CIREC rehabilitation programme “Seeds of Hope” According to the website http://cirec.org
“In the development of this program, CIREC has benefited from the support of organizations like USAID, IOM
(International Migration Organization), LSN (Landmine Survivors Network), Star of Hope, UNICEF and the
governments of Canada and Sweden.”
H

H
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(ii)

(iii)
(iv)

source of information. The majority of governments have provided indirect
support through international organizations. For example, in 2003,
Switzerland, together with the EU, supported activities by the Geneva Call to
engage Colombian non-state actors.
Inconsistent reporting, including some confusion between planned
programme size and the actual funding received. Both the OAS and the
National Mine Action Plan have reqested substantially more funding than
was actually delivered.
No estimates available for some projects which have been funded, or for the
costs of health system treatment for mine victims.
The probable use of military personnel trained as humanitarian deminers on
other unspecified tasks (this appears to be the only explanation for 80
deminers clearing a total of 0.6 hectares in a year).

A detailed table of funding as reproted in Landmine Monitor, and the EC co-funded projects
is in Annex 3 to this report.
A summary chart is shown below. The Landmine Monitor summary has usually listed the
funding by year of its announcement, whereas the EC lists by year of start of project. For
consistency in this regard the year of the LM summary is used for the chart. For exact details
of EC funding please see Annex 4.
Figure 5 –Mine Action funding in Colombia 2002-6

The Colombian government spent a total of $3.3 million on mine action in 2002 according to
reporting by the Resource Mobilization Contact Group of States Parties. This is the only
available figure for any government funding for 2002 but appears to very much higher than
the funding for subsequent years so may have been calculated in a different way or be an
error.
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Colombia’s Article 7 Report of April 2003 provides the country’s estimates of needed
funding for mine action for the four-year period from 2003-2006. As of April 2003, the
estimated necessary funding for the period 2003-2006 totaled US$13.8 million, including
$2.4 million for 2003. Funding obtained as of mid-2003 for 2003-2006 totaled about $5
million.
The budget is broken down into five areas according to the national plan. “Humanitarian
demining for humanitarian emergencies” by the army in combat zones 23 accounts for
nearly 80 percent of the total budget, with approximately $1.6 million allocated for 2003
and $11 million for the period from 2003-2006. The next highest expenditure is “the
National Action Plan” with $550,000 allocated for 2003 and $1.6 million for 2003-2006.
“Prevention of landmine accidents” is budgeted at $200,000 for 2003 and $900,000 for
2003-2006. “Mine action information management” is allocated $33,000 in 2003 and
$267,000 for 2003-2006. Finally, there is “international cooperation management” with
$16,000 allocated for 2003 and $60,000 for 2003-2006.
PF
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The Article 7 report provides information on the sources of funding for 2003-2006.
According to the report, the Colombian government and four donors together provided
$1.2 million for 2003, 50% of the stated requirements. The main funds came from the
country’s national budget, which allocated approximately $882,000 for 2003 and $4.9
million for 2003-2006.
Colombia reported that the $494,906 to be provided through the OAS under the two-year
agreement reached in March 2003 will be allocated as follows: $256,506 for administration
and supervision, $130,000 in prevention education, $30,000 for training of Colombian
personnel, $30,000 for victim assistance, $30,000 for logistics, and $9,400 for other activities.
Allocation of well over 50% of the total budget for administration and supervision may
appear excessive, but is usual for the OAS demining work in Latin America. However, of the
total planned, only $115,000 was donated by Canada, amounting to 23%.
In 2006, the Observatory was reported to have received a total of $6 million to carry out
its activities to date. Funding had been provided by Canada, Japan, Sweden, the US, the
EC, UNDP, IOM and UNICEF.
Overall, donors have not been prepared to fund a large proportion of the requests from
Colombia.
The 2006 end of year review of the UN’s Portfolio of Mine Action Projects reported that
Colombia received only 3 percent ($157,110) of funds requested through the appeal process
in 2006. In October 2006 UNICEF reported a shortfall of 88 percent of required funds for its
mine action programs in Colombia. UNICEF reported funding of $76,071 provided by
Germany against $650,000 required funds for 2006. The UN Mine Action Service
(UNMAS) reported that lack of funding resulted in the cancellation of MRE materials and
affected medical and physical rehabilitation programs and the “psychological well-being” of
mine victims and their families.
The 2007 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects included 21 project appeals for Colombia
with a total value of $6,250,431. Information as to how much of this total was funded is
not yet available.
23 As noted elsewhere, this does not conform to usual descriptions of humanitarian demining but is emergency
demining for which there appears to be no quality management process nor marking nor reporting.
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EC CONTRIBUTION
Although Colombia has received about 60% of all EC mine action funding for Latin America,
mine action remains a very small part of the overall EC support to Colombia, and even a very
small part of the relief and development aid. There are a number of high-level cooperation
agreements between the EC and EU, and Colombia. 24 The three principal areas of cooperation
are: Regional development and peace; Governance, justice, and human rights; and
Productivity, competition and commerce. The delegation website lists 78 projects currently
running in July 2007 with a total value of over 186 million euros. 25 Mine Action accounts for
about 1.5% of the current total with less than 3 million euros. In comparison, support for
Colombia’s millions of displaced people receives 46 million euros and the “Laboratorios de
Paz,” usually literally translated as “Peace Laboratories,” three large scale initiatives to
support civil society peace building 26 , received 92 million euros. This inevitably leads to the
same problem of fragmentation of dispersed funds, and isolation of staff with responsibility
for mine action, that has been found in other latin American countries. With such a small
percentage of the total aid and development funding project there is no possibility that the
delegation in Colombia can have a specialist in mine action on the staff, and the person
responsible will have limited time and resources for mine action amongst a large portfolio of
other projects. There is a limited amount of time for programme officers to acquire
specialised knowledge about mine action and limited support resources. This is part of a
more general problem of fragmentation and isolation in EC mine action which is discussed in
more detail in the regional report. One way to mitigate the isolation would be improved
contact between programme officers dealing with mine action in different countries in Latin
America. Another mitigation action would be to provide EC programme officers with (a)
good quality reference documentation about how to design, negotiate, manage and evaluate
mine action projects and (b) expert technical support in the critical phases of contract design
and evaluation.
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Both deconcentration and the ending of the thematic AP mine action budget line have
contributed to increasing this isolation, even though both processes also bring other benefits
and are part of the change of orientation and implementation of EC aid and foreign policy on
a very large scale. Finding ways to work successfully within the new context is essential.
EC PLANS FOR ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA
The basis for aid and cooperation is the Country Strategy Paper (CSP), drawn up by the EC
delegation in close consultation with the national authorities and civil society.
The CSP 2002-6 includes mines as a part of the impact of the conflict in Colombia. Based on
an exploratory mission by UNMAS the CSP focusses on just one action, a mine impact
survey, which has not yet been realised. None of the difficulties due to ongoing conflict of
undertaking a full LIS to community level are noted in the CSP.
The CSP 2007-13 includes mine action in two areas:
“1. To achieve a short-term impact on the conflict in Colombia, the EU will first of all
provide assistance to the victims of violence […]
24 Full details on the Colombia delegation website
http://www.delcol.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_colombia/agreements.htm
25 http://www.delcol.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_colombia/proyects.htm
26 The CSP 2002-6 states: “[…] specifically, the laboratories should have four basic components:
· Culture of peace and integral rights: education/training, creation/support of civil society networks, etc.
· Productive activities: support to sustainable rural development proposals.
· Social and productive infrastructures: basic infrastructures such as sanitation, schools, etc.
· Institutional strengthening: particularly of local institutions with emphasis in planning and programming, health,
etc.
H
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[…] – Operations aimed at educating people against risks, helping victims and clearing mines
are to be continued.” (page 24)
“2. With a view to achieving a medium-term effect on the conflict in Colombia, the EU will
endeavour to promote peace at local and national level […]
[…]
– by working to bring about human security, according to the Colombian government requests
and the limitations imposed by the community instruments for development cooperation and
for stability.
Possible actions include: building capacity in civil society and the government in the fight
against trafficking and the illicit spread of small arms and light weapons, related ammunition,
de-pollution of anti-personnel mines and remnants of war;[…]” (page 25)
(All emphases in the original).
The CSP thus clearly establishes the context of mine action as support to victims and peace
promotion, and establishes the linkage between mine action and Small Arms and Light
Weapons proliferation (SALW) and ERW issues. However, the inclusion of mine clearance
suggests that (a) the strong monopoly of the army and (b) the impossibility of humanitarian
demining before the end of the conflict, are not fully appreciated by the delegation. The CSP
also makes reference here to the “limitations imposed by the community instruments for
development cooperation and for stability.”
Limitations imposed by the new Instruments
In meetings, the delegation staff expressed the need to have in place a planned response to
any movement in the currently blocked peace process. The ability to respond quickly and
positively to any opportunity to move to a peaceful resolution of over 40 years’ conflict was
perceived as a strategic priority. However, the delegation staff considered that the new
Instruments offered no obvious mechanism to support this type of “preparedness planning.”
Even in peace building this is not an issue strictly limited to demining, and there are parallel
issues (noted by the delegations in Peru and Nicaragua) regarding their ability to support
reconstruction shortly after unforeseen natural disasters, through the new Instruments
CURRENT MINE ACTION ACTIVITIES AND PLANS
There are currently several thematic areas of activity in mine action in Colombia:
(i) capacity building of the national mine action structures of the Presidential Programme for
Integral Action against Anti-Personnel Landmines PPAICMA, including the national IMSMA
system, (ii) training army humanitarian deminers, and limited amounts of demining around
military bases, (iii) mine risk education undertaken by a large number of organisations in a
variety of different approaches (iv) victim assistance, through advocacy to ensure victims
know their rights and the support available through the national health system and also by
offering extensive support to the rehabilitation and reintegration of a small number of victims.
The EC’s principal project has been 2.5 million euro support for capacity building the
national mine action structures. A full list of all current EC funded mine action projects is
included in Annex 4 to this report.
ANALYSIS
Given the very large scale of the overall contamination in the country, and the available
financial resources of a medium sized nation in the middle-income group of countries, there is
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a good case for establishing a long term national humanitarian demining capacity and
management structures. 27 Questions arise regarding:
PF
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(a) How the current exclusive use of military personnel for humanitarian demining relates to
the strategy of Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD). The potential
role of NGOs or commercial clearance companies remains unexplored. If the current
military monopoly on mine clearance is to be maintained then the scope for action by the
EC may be severely curtailed.
(b) The use of humanitarian funding to train and equip serving military personnel who are
re-assigned onto tasks other than humanitarian demining (as defined by IMAS) has also
not been discussed. This was reported by other organisations, who want to be strictly
neutral in order to undertake humanitarian or development work, as being a problem.
(c) Linkage of military planning and implementation structures to the EC established project
cycle management methods, which are mandated for development projects.
(d) Timing - any purely humanitarian capacity established long before a peace agreement or
military victory will be unused until the end of conflict is achieved in a large enough area
to occupy the capacity. This raises issues of efficiency, and also the redeployment of
humanitarian deminers funded by donor aid to other military duties including combat
demining while they are waiting for the emergence of large scale humanitarian demining
objectives during a peace process. See item (b) above.
There is also a larger issue of alignment which, according to the three main independent
actors interviewed (UNICEF, CCCM, Pastoral Social) has serious implications. The
PPAICMA does not share this view, and as a government organisation is aligned with the
government view that the problem of armed conflict is due to terrorists or insurgents who are
not legitimate. Essentially, the EC works with the Colombian government and its institutions,
in this case the Presidential Programme. In the cities this is not contentious – the conflict is
far away and has little impact on the cities. However, the three respondents who work in the
countryside presented a unanimous view that this results in the EC being perceived as
aligning itself with one side to the conflict. One consequence is that any information given to
MRE programmes (or a future landmine impact survey) is perceived as giving information to
the government who might then pass it to the army who will use it for military planning. The
support for building national mine action structures is apparently perceived in some zones as
direct support to the government, and to be seen to support this can be risky. This reflects the
very strong need for people in the countryside to be strictly neutral to avoid repressive actions
from one side or the other – it is not necessarily because people are opposed to the
government, but they are living in combat zones and cannot be seen to favour one side or the
other. The difference in perspective in interviews between organisations working in the
countryside and those in the city was striking – the gap appears to be very wide.
Further support to building the humanitarian demining capacity of the army would be seen by
many as deeply prejudicial. It is reported that the army already has hundreds of combat
deminers and any deminer training could be perceived as supporting this fighting capability.
CONCLUSIONS
Colombia has a severe impact from landmines, and significant impact from other ERW. It is
unique in this regard in Latin America. It is also unusual worldwide in that there is continued
active use of AP and AT landmines.

27 See the section on Resilience-Impact analysis in the 2005 Global Evaluation for the detailed explanation of how
this judgment is reached.
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The inclusion of military combat casualties in official statistics for mine victims in Colombia
is a departure from standard practice which is not justified.
The ongoing conflict and considerable danger to anyone who is considered as “involved” with
mine use or clearance makes mine action such as MRE and especially survey, extremely
difficult. Providing information about mine locations for the pruposes of MRE can lead to
reprisals.
The national mine action structures in Colombia are still at the stage of gaining experience
and expertise. Given a total investment of about 6 million dollars plus considerable support
from the GICHD (IMSMA and MRE support) over a period of several years, this is a
disappointing outcome. It should have been possible to have a good quality system already
fully functional for the resources used.
The 2.5 million euros that the EC is providing to support the national mine action structures is
perceived by key independent field actors as firmly aligning the EC with the goverment of
Colombia. This is in conflict with the desire for strict neutrality by these organisations who
insist that such an alignment creates difficulties for establishing MRE capabilities, and will
impact negatively on data gathering for the proposed survey activities. However, the
Commission has no real choice other than supporting the PPAICMA as the coordination body
for mine action and especially for MRE, the EC is essentially a “government-level” structure
which works with national governments.
Mine clearance in Colombia is an exclusive monopoly of the military. Serving military
personnel have been trained and equipped as “humanitarian deminers” by humanitarian donor
aid administered through the OAS. The main task of these personnel is apparently
“emergency humanitarian demining” which is not humanitarian demining according to agreed
international standards. There is no way of knowing if these humanitarian deminiers are also
deployed for combat demining. The interface between humanitarian aid and military run
programmes is far from easy in terms of Project Cycle Management, LRRD and in the overall
acceptable use of humanitarian funds. The OAS programme has offered particularly poor
value for money with well over 50% of costs designated for administration and supervision.
One impact of deconcentration and the new Instruments has been to increase the isolation of
EC programme coordinators (or project officers) isolated and without sufficient training and
reference resources. There is also a particular issue in Colombia of the lack of a clear
mechanism within the new Instruments for putting in place plans for future action, in order to
be ready to move quickly should the current deadlock in the peace process be broken (or the
Colombian government achieve an unqualified military victory). Mine action is not the only
area which was identified as facing this issue. Coordination with other areas, such as natural
disaster response, which also face similar problems would appear essential if mine action is to
find the necessary ways of working. Mine action is simply too small a scale activity to be
able to influence overall EC aid delivery strategy on its own. Since mine aciton is included in
the previous and current CSP it should be possible in Colombia to use the geographic budget
line for a large part of mine action funding. However, any continuation of the previous work
of Geneva Call with non-state actors in Colombia may be very much more difficult to fund as
the national government actively opposes this action.
There is limited room for manoeuvre for the EC in planning any further mine action in
Colombia. There are restrictions on scope of activities, due to (i) the ongoing conflict, (ii)
severe problems with personal security in some areas, (iii) the monopoly on mine clearance
by the military, and (iv) the already substantial support for national capacity building from
both the national government and donors. MRE and VA appear to be the only two suitable
areas for future funding. MRE is being addressed by Community Liaison approaches by a
number of actors, VA is being addressed by advocacy and education programmes to make
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mine victims aware of their right to medical and other services paid by the state, as well as
good quality services for a small number of victims. Until there is a move towards peace
there may be little further of real added value for the EC to consider beyond continued
support for MRE and VA in either in departments where the local authorities are taking a
strong initiative, or in concertation with the large “Peace laboratories” also funded by the EC.
Coordination with existing actors appears more likely to give results than new and possibly
isolated initiatives, especially in the climate of lack of trust and open repression that is widely
reported.
Whilst it may be a political necessity to have plans in place to support any move towards
ending the long conflict, there remain difficulties in effectively achieving these goals until
there is some survey of landmine impact and victims, and ways to intervene as a neutral actor
are identified.
EVALUATION CRITERIA
RELEVANCE.
The programme appears to have been relevant given the constraints identified in Colombia.
An increased focus on working with neutral actors and less direct support for the government
might have been more relevant, but has to be balanced against the fundamental relationship of
the European Union institutions which is to work with national governments.
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME
The substantial support to national mine action structures has not been particularly effective,
the other projects are still at an early stage so an overall judgement is difficult to make.
EFFICIENCY OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME
As with effectiveness, support to national mine action structures has not been particularly
efficient, the other projects are still at an early stage so an overall judgement is difficult to
make.
IMPACT OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME
The impact has been disappointing. This is due to (i) the significant constraints which apply in
Colombia due to the conflict, (ii) the results of the fragmentation and isolation of mine action
implementation by the EC, and (iii) due to other factors such as the extremely high level of
politicisation of mine action in Colombia.
SUSTAINABILITY OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME
The Colombian government is providing substantial national funding for mine action and the
national structures appear likely to be sustainable. Victim assistance is also supported as part
of the national health system. MRE is unlikely to be sustainable at present.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In any further funding for mine action consideration should be given to supporting
independent actors such as the ICRC, UNICEF, Pastoral Social, CCCM or other independent
NGOs to reinforce the perceived status of the EC as a neutral and unbiased source of
development aid. This is understood as potentially being in conflict with the need to support
national mine action structures, but a balance between the two requirements should be
identified.
The EC delegation in Colombia should increase contact with EC delegations in neighbouring
mine-affected countries to generate and maintain synergies. Regional, or even sub-regional
contact - even if occasional and at an informal level - between EuropeAid staff (and, if
relevant ECHO staff) who are directly responsible for projects, could make a real difference
to the issue of fragmentation and isolation.
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Given the large scale support already given to national mine action structures, and the
substantial government support for their own programme, it is difficult to recommend any
further support to this area.
Given the military monopoly on mine clearance and the difficuty of identifying the outcome
of supporting and equipping military personnel as humanitarian deminers, it is recommended
that there should be no further support for this training or for clearance. It is, however,
recommended, that the EC open a dialogue with the Colombian authorities regarding possible
future NGO activity in mine clearance after a peace agreement has been achieved.
Any future support for Victim Assistance should be based on (i) further developing the
advocacy activities already undertaken by a number of NGOs and international organisations
which are working to make people aware of their right to health care and rehabilitation
through the national health system, and compensation for mine injuries from the government,
and (ii) supporting victims’ associations.
Any future support for MRE should continue to develop the relationships established with,
and funding for the current project implementers. In line with current best practice,
Community Liaison approaches should always be used for MRE. A balance needs to befound
between supporting independent NGOs and other organisations, and supporting the national
mine action structures who need to put in place guidelines to ensure consistent application of
MRE methods and messages in Colombia.
The EC should press both the PPAICMA and CCCM to use the standard reporting method of
basing the annual reporting of mine victims on civilian casualties, and casualties amongst
humanitarian deminers. It may be useful to note military combat casualties, including the
military deminers that comprise over a third of all casualties 28 , as a separate indictor of
ongoing mine use, but the two figures should be reported separately and not aggregated.
PF
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28 “Situación por MAP y MUSE 1990 – 15 Noviembre de 2007” Programa Presidencial Para la Acción Integral
contra Minas Antipersonal, Bogota.
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2. REPORT ON THE MISSION TO PERU
INTRODUCTION
This report provides the findings, conclusions, and recommendations from an independent
evaluation of EC-funded mine action activities in Peru. This evaluation is part of a broader
regional evaluation of EC-funded mine action in Latin America, the focus of which is on
policy, strategy, and programming. The Terms of Reference (ToR) are appended as Annex 1
of the overall report.
The Peru component of the regional evaluation is based on the findings of a mission by
Russell Gasser 29 to Lima from 11 to 15th December 2007, coupled with a review of
documents.
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BACKGROUND
Peru is the third largest country in Latin America (21st in the world). With an area of 1,28
million sq km it is slightly larger than Angola and 29% of the total size of the EU27. The
population is estimated at 29 million. The Human Development Index 30 places Peru at a
similar level as its neighbours Colombia and Ecuador, around 80th in world rank order.
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 31 places Peru in 72nd rank order,
equal with China, Mexico, India and Brazil. While Peru cannot be considered as a very poor
country overall, there are striking differences between rich and poor and the country’s Gini
coefficient 32 (disparity of income) is over 0.50 (again, very similar to many of its neighbours).
About 20% of the population lives in extreme poverty and a further 30% in poverty. The
climate varies from tropical in the east to dry desert in the west, and from temperate to frigid
in the Andes. There are three distinct regions: the western coastal plain (costa), high and
rugged Andes in center (sierra) rising to 6768m, and eastern lowland jungle of the Amazon
Basin (selva). Peru is subject to natural disasters including earthquakes, tsunamis, flooding,
landslides, and volcanic activity.
P

P

PF

P

PF

PF

FP

P

FP

P

P

FP

Figure 6 – Map of Peru the area on the border with Ecuador which has mine
contamination is ringed in red.

29 Russell Gasser is an independent consultant working for Humanitarian Technology Consulting Limited.
30 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
31 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007
32 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2172.html Worldwide, Gini coefficients
range from 0.23 in Sweden to 0.71 in Namibia.
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ORIGIN AND EXTENT OF THE CONTAMINATION
Peru has two separate and unrelated landmine contamination problems on its national
territory, with some contamination by other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) 33 . Peru is
also impacted by mines along the border with Chile which are in Chilean territory but which
have caused accidents to Peruvians who cross the border illegally for economic reasons.
TPF
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There is antipersonnel mine and some limited ERW contamination in a remote jungle
region on the border with Ecuador. This is due to the brief but intense border war with
Ecuador, the Cenepa war, from 26 January to 28 February 1995. There had been
previous brief border wars in the same area in 1829, 1859-60, and 1941. It is now
known that both countries laid mines along some parts of a 78 km stretch of the border
which was in dispute, though it is only in the last two years that Peru has formally
declared the mined areas. Previously Peru had stated that it had not used mines, then
moved to stating that 120,000 mines had been used, 34 before lowering the estimate to
about 30,000. Some reports suggest that the mines on the Peruvian side may in fact
have been laid shortly after the end of active conflict in order to block access routes in
the event of renewed hostilities leading to Ecuadoran forces seeking to cross the border.
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There may well also be very small numbers of AP mines laid by Ecuadoran patrols
advancing into Peruvian territory. Locating these few unrecorded mines (if indeed they
exist) would appear to be a nearly impossible task in the dense jungle vegetation.
Some 184,000 people live in the north-eastern part of the border areas with Ecuador
that are mine-affected. The south-western end is uninhabited apart from a few army
border observation posts. The dense jungle areas of the Peruvian-Ecuador border in
Amazonas Department are home to the Shuar and Achuar indigenous peoples on both
sides of the border, and the Aguaruna and Huambisa on Peruvian territory. These
people were displaced by the border conflict and their ability to return to a traditional
way of life is constrained by the landmine and UXO problem, according to UNMAS 35 .
In November 1998, the “Families Shuar and Achuar of the Frontier” issued a joint
declaration to the international community asking for the governments of both
countries to demine the border.
PF
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33 ERW includes unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned ordnance (AXO) as well as mines.
34 Landmine Monitor 2001 reported: “Perú estimates that 120,000 antipersonnel mines are laid in its territory
along the border with Ecuador in the departments of Tumbes, Piura, Cajamarca, Amazonas and Loreto. […] The
most mine-affected area is in the Cordillera del Condór region, where approximately 80,000 nomadic indigenous
peoples live.”
35 Reported in Landmine Monitor 2000
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Figure 7 – Map of disputed border area (from Wikipedia).

Electric pylons (high-voltage transmission line towers) and some police bases and high
security prisons in Peru were ringed by AP mines from 1989 onwards, to protect them
from attack by armed insurgents (the Shining Path Sendero Luminoso guerillas, and
also the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement). A special division of the police, 60
officers in total of whom about half had specialist training, placed IEDs (Improvised
Explosive Devices) (mines of their own improvisation 36 ) and later AP mines of a
design by the Peru Navy, around the base of the electric pylons. Typically, 30 to 50 AP
mines were planted around each of 1,711 towers located at strategic spots in the
departments of Lima, Junín, Huancavélica and Ica. Many of the towers are at high
altitude and have extreme weather conditions for part of the year. Each time one of the
towers needed technical maintenance a safe lane was opened by deactivating and
moving the landmines from a strip of land where the same mines would be replanted
and reactivated later 37 .
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36 The initial design was an adapted army grenade equipped with a system of pressure activation, assembled at the
site where it was planted.
37 Further information can be found in a detailed article in the Journal of Mine Action issue 10.2 “Finally, Safe
Demining” by Vinicius Souza and Maria Eugênia Sá
http://maic.jmu.edu/JOURNAL/10.2/mip/souza/souza.htm
H
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3.

Mines were planted by Chile on the Chilean side of the border with Peru (and other
borders of Chile) between 1975 and 1976. In 1999 it was reported in Landmine
Monitor that non-governmental organizations in the southern Peruvian border town of
Tacna had protested, and had claimed that the mines have been responsible for at least
fifteen deaths and approximately 200 injuries. The NGOs warn Peruvians about the
dangers of attempting to cross the border illegally to seek work in Chile, and they have
asked for demining of the area since the late 1990s. There continue to be a small
number of casualties each year in this border minefield which is the responsibility of
Chile even though the victims are from Peru. These are usually reported in the casualty
data for Chile. In 2007 Peru made a formal protest to the Organization of Amercian
States about the continued presence of the minefield and Peruvian casualties.

REPORTED CASUALTIES
There have been statements for several years that the Ecuador-Peru border is the main cause
of casualties. This is the position taken by the OAS, and other reports may be repeating this
information. However, the available data suggests that the ERW contaminated areas inside
the country have caused far more casualties than the border region. As far as can be
ascertained, all the UXO incidents were in the interior of the country. If this is the case then
reported border casualties in recent years have been at most one person per year and most
probably zero.
Casualties are reported by successive Landmine Monitor reports as follows:
Table 3 – Casualties (Blank cells on the table indicate no data available)

Year

Killed

Injured

Total

Mines

UXO

2006

5

8

13

1

12

2005

4

5

9

1

8

5

0

5

2004
2003 accidents

0

13

13

2003 due to Guerilla mine use

7

1

8

8

2002

0

19

19

11

1995-1999

8

179

There is broad agreement (including the Red Cross and the Association of Victims and
Survivors of Minefields, AVISCAM) that casualty data is likely to be significantly underreported, in part due to the very remote location of some of the mined areas.
The victims’ association has been energetically calling for a full national census of victims
and survivors for some years without success. There have been a large number of casualties
amongst the police deminers, at least 67 police deminers have been killed or injured, though
some sources suggest that a census of the police showed the total is 87. There have also been
civilian casualties in areas around electric pylons which have been cleared, leading to
demands for re-clearance which is now in progress. And, even then there were further
casualties in a number of locations leading to a third round of clearance in some cases. Of the
179 casualties reported from 1995 to 1999, 62 were soldiers and 67 were police, 50 were
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civilians. There have also been several incidents on the Chilean side of the Peru-Chile border
where Peruvian citizens crossing illegally for economic purposes have been killed or injured.
The Peruvian side of the border is not mined.
REMAINING CONTAMINATION ON THE PERU-ECUADOR BORDER
Following clearance efforts in recent years, the request for an extension to the deadline for
clearance under Article 5 of the APMBT gave the following information in April 2007: Total
number of mines cleared so far is 1,603. There are 35 dangerous areas remaining in the
Cordillero del Condor containing an estimated 30,718 AP mines in a total area of 210,140
square metres.
Table 4 – Remaining Contamination on the Peru-Ecuador Border

Location

Number of mined Estimated number of Area affected square
areas
AP mines
metres

Santiago

8

5,956

34,365

Cenepa

22

21,256

131,449

5

3,506

44,326

Achuime

The impact of the mines in the border area is low; local people are affected but the region is
only sparsely populated.
Figure 8 – Map of the 35 mined areas on the Peru side of the Peru-Ecuador border.
From CONTRAMINAS request for an extension under Article 5 of the MBT
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REMAINING CONTAMINATION IN OTHER AREAS OF PERU
After some variation of the figures since 2002, Peru now reports that a total of 1,711 electrical
towers belonging to the electricity company EDEGEL SA and the company ETECEN
S.A.have been cleared, with 59,974 mines destroyed. In 2002, the ICRC reported that
approximately 350 communities lived in close proximity to mined towers. 38
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CONTRAMINAS, the national mine action authority estimates that about 700 pylons remain
to be demined again to reach humanitarian demining standards following unsatisfactory initial
clearance. There have been accidents in supposedly cleared areas.
Other demining tasks to be completed, around infrastructure which was mined as a response
to the internal conflicts, include:
•
One electricity sub-station.
•
Three transmission antennas in Cuto Cuto, Llahuaspuquio and Humurca.
•
Two police bases, the anti-drugs base in Santa Lucía and the anti-terrorist base
in Tulumayo.
•
Three maximum security prisons each of which has about three thousand mines
around it: Castro Castro, Yanamayo, and Huacariz.
AVISCAM, the Association of Victims and Survivors who have an official role in observing
police demining teams as part of the Quality Management process, estimate that there are
about 20,000 mines to be cleared in total other than the Peru Ecuador border area.
Figure 9 –Left: power line routes and Right: Prisons and Police bases still to be fully
cleared of mines.

HISTORY OF MINE ACTION
Peru signed the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention in December 1997. In May 1998, the
Law for the National Adoption of the Ottawa Treaty (Legislative Resolution 26951) was
approved and on 17 June 1998, Peru became the nineteenth nation to ratify the Anti-personnel
Mine Ban Convention.
38 Reported in Landmine Monitor 2004
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Peru states that its production of antipersonnel mines ceased in 1997, and that the process of
converting the production facilities began in March 1999. The UN Mine Action Service
(UNMAS) Assessment Mission to Peru reported that production of landmines in the country
only ceased entirely in January 1999, according to officials at the Ministry of Defense. 39
PF
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As part of the peace agreement of 26 October 1998, Peru and Ecuador agreed to demining of
the border under the supervision of the Ecuador/Peru Multinational Observation Mission,
MOMEP. MOMEP is made up of military representatives from the United States, Brazil,
Argentina and Chile.
In April 1999, the OAS set up the “Program for Demining Assistance in Ecuador/Perú”
(PADEP). The first phase involved clearance to permit placement of border markers. This
was done in collaboration with the Ecuadorian military at the beginning of 1999. The
operation took ninety days to complete and cost over U.S.$3.5 million. From the start
operations in the border area were extremely expensive, in part due to the difficult access and
working conditions.
There were two initial evaluations of the mine problem in Peru. A mission was conducted by
the Organization of American States (OAS) in August 1999 to evaluate the AP mine situation
along the Peru-Ecuador border. In August-September 1999, UNMAS conducted a multidisciplinary and inter-agency assessment mission to both Ecuador and Peru.
Canada, Japan, the United States, Spain, OAS and UNDP contributed funds to support mine
clearance for demarcation of the Ecuador-Peru border. Peru was formally included in the
U.S. humanitarian demining program in February 1999 and received $3.2 million in
assistance in 1999 and 2000.
In 2000 a group of former police deminers established the victim support group Asociación de
Víctimas y Sobrevivientes de Campos Minados (Association of Victims and Survivors of
Minefields) AVISCAM. This is the only nationwide victims’ association in the country, and
AVISCAM also undertakes a number of roles including independent monitoring of current
police demining teams for quality assurance purposes, victim assistance (VA), some mine
risk education (MRE), and advocacy. AVISCAM is also currently active in efforts to ban
cluster munitions. 40
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In 2001, the governments of Ecuador and Peru signed separate agreements with the
Organization of American States (OAS) for the coordination of international support for mine
action through the Program for Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines
(AICMA) of the Office for Humanitarian Mine Action (OHMA). Shortly after signing the
agreements the OHMA established AICMA Program offices in Quito and Lima and began
coordinating efforts to begin mine clearance operations.
In December 2002 the national mine action council CONTRAMINAS was established and a
National Mine Action Plan written.
The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) has supported demining operations in both
countries by providing international monitors since 2003. The IADB coordinates the team of
international monitors who compose the Assistance Mission for Mine Clearance in South
America (MARMINAS).

39 Reported in Landmine Monitor 2000.
40 AVISCM have produced a video calling for a ban on Cluster Bombs (Bombas de Racimo) avaialble on
YouTube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E402qkbiEoQ
H
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NATIONAL MINE ACTION STRUCTURES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.
Peru has a well established structure for national mine action. The National Mine Action
Coordination body is the Peruvian Centre for Action against Antipersonnel Landmines,
CONTRAMINAS. This is comprised of an Executive Council whose membership consists of
representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs MFA (who have the permanent
presidency), Defence, Interior, Education, Health, and the National Council for the Integration
of People with Disabilities which is part of the Ministry for Women and Social Development.
There is also a Technical Secretary is from the MFA (Chancellery) concerned with the UN
and multilateral relations who is responsible for implementing decisions made by the council.
The permanent secretariat comprises two persons. The Coordinator oversees the four main
areas of IMSMA, MRE, Human Rights, and administration. There is also a military officer
on secondment to undertake liaison with the Division of Humanitarian Demining of the Army
Engineers.
CONTRAMINAS has developed good working relationships with such bodies as the
international Red Cross, and the national mine victim association, AVISCAM. They also
have a good working relationship with the OAS.
In common with other Latin American countries, the OAS and the national army play key
roles in demining. Peru is unusual in that the task of clearance is divided between the army
who are responsible for the border demining resulting from the war with Ecuador, and the
police, who are responsible for mines inside the national territory which were used during the
conflict with internal armed revolutionary movements.
Figure 10 – Organisational structure for mine action for clearance of Ecuador - Peru
border areas. From AICMA website.
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FUNDING FOR MINE ACTION
The internal clearance work by the police and the border clearance work undertaken by the
army are funded separately and have different mechanisms.
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Both CONTRAMINAS and the Peruvian Army are aware of the need to increase donor
interest and to broaden the donor base. Immediately before the evaluation visit,
CONTRAMINAS, together with the Peruvian Army, had organised a conference for the local
representatives of potential bilateral donors such as the ambassadors of major donor countries.
CONTRAMINAS clearly regards this as an integral part of its role, and expressed the view
that Peru feels that donors are not particularly interested as it is not an extremely poor
country, nor is the mine problem severe by international standards.
The funding for the border clearance is administered through the OAS demining programme.
This gives very little visibility to donors and it would be possible to get the mistaken
impression that OAS is the key funding organisation - in fact it acts as an agent for the
donors, in much the same way as international organisations like UNDP coordinate and seek
donors for multilateral programmes which they have designed and which they seek to
implement.
The AICMA website states that “since the establishment of the AICMA Program in Peru,
financial assistance has been provided by the governments of Canada, Italy and the United
States, as well as by the European Commission.” This does not adequately reflect the
different relative sizes of the donations which range from a few thousand to well over a
million dollars.
The police clearance work of the electric pylons is directly funded by the privatised electric
companies. This is certainly very unusual in Latin America where the dominant model is for
national military (sometimes together with special police divisions) to undertake the work
through the OAS. Funding for the clearance of infrastructure by the police will come from
either the government or donors, it is not yet clear which.
EC CONTRIBUTION
On 30 December 2005, Peru and Ecuador concluded an agreement with the EU for funding of
€1 million ($1,244,900 at that time) for joint clearance of the Cordillera del Cóndor region
and for MRE. The total cost of the project was €1,405,038 ($1,749,132), including the €1
million provided by the EC. Peru has not identified how it will contribute its portion of the
remaining €405,038 ($504,232) of the total project cost. However, the governments of Peru
and Ecuador are responsible for providing the project with in-kind contributions of demining
personnel and logistical support. This is, however, not reflected in the published OAS budget
for the project which includes training and equipping deminers, as well as their salaries.
According to available records, principally the Landmine Monitor, the following funding has
been received. It is believed that this is not a complete list.
Table 5 – EU Contribution

Donor

Date

Amount

Source of
informatio
n

Spanish Agency of
International
Cooperation

1998 730,000 US$ (Army Engineers School)

LM 1999
LM 2000

Russia, Japan

1998 Unspecified - equipment, instructors, training

LM 1999
LM 2000

1998 Unspecified donation in kind

LM 1999

Argentina,
Chile

Brazil,
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Donor

Canada

USA

Date

Amount

1999 CAN$300,000
(USA$ 198,000) divided between Peru and
Ecuador
1999 - approximately USA $3,225 million in
2000 assistance in 1999 and 2000,

Source of
informatio
n
LM2000

LM 1999

USA

2001 $1.66 million for US Special Operations Forces
“train the trainer” programs, vehicles and
equipment

LM 2002

USA

2002 US$1 million for OAS programme

Japan

2002 US$594,000 for OAS programme

Canada, Australia

2001 Can US$448,616 Aus US$38,917
For stockpile destruction in Peru, Ecuador and
Honduras

LM 2002

ETECEN (Electric
Company)

2002 US$371,000 for clearance of 350 pylons by
police

LM 2003

OAS (original donor
not specified)

2002 US$100,000 insurance, equipment, food
lodging

LM 2003

ETECEN (Electric
Company)

2002 US$1,991,500 for clearance of further 1,350
pylons by police and navy services.

LM 2003

Italy

2004 US$19,305 for demining

LM 2006

USA

2004 US$500,000 through OAS

LM 2006

European
Commission

2006 €1 million (USA$1,244,900) through OAS

LM 2006

Italy

2006 €19,000 (USA$23,653) through OAS

LM 2006

In 2004, the Peruvian government reported to States Parties its national contributions to mine
action in the country, totaling US$3.38 million from 1999 to 2003. Peru reported national
funding for mine action totaling US$795,413 in 2006, US$276,983 in monetary contributions,
US$518,430 in-kind. According to CONTRAMINAS, the national government contributes
about 20% of the cost of the border clearance operations, some US$150,000 per year.
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Textbox 1 – Strategic and Technical Goals of Project Funding
The EC funding for Peru Ecuador border clearance was made available in the context of support
for “consolidation of the peace process” - this was the overall strategic goal, rather than demining
being the overall goal. The project was identified in 2002-3, and then proposed by Peru in 2004
and subsequently by Ecuador. In 2005 a letter of agreement was signed by both countries and
in 2006 the project formally started. The EC delegation noted the considerable political
importance to the Peruvian government of demining the border.
The cost per square metre cleared of the programme was already high in the proposal, around
USA$15-20 per square metre, largely due to the inaccessible location. The number of
inhabitants of the zone is low. From the outset the impact of the demining itself was going to be
very limited, and in the end, on the Peruvian side, the goals were not achieved with results an
order of magnitude less than planned.
However, in the broader context of the project there have been very substantial achievements.
The former head of Military Humanitarian Demining in Peru, General Juan Méndiz, while
recognising the failure to achieve the technical goals and the clear need for improved field
efficiency, was enthusiastic about the strategic achievements. In his words “I can now pick up
the phone and call my colleague in Ecuador and we just discuss how to resolve any difficulties.
At the start of the project I did not know who he was, and we had to get the OAS to arrange the
first meeting and act as mediator.” At this level the Peruvian military clearly feel positive about
working together with the Ecuadoran military to clear the ERW from a bitter war that took place
only 12 years previously - after over 150 years of border disputes.
CONTRAMINAS took a similarly positive view. “Signing a piece of paper in the capital does not
bring peace, we need to change how people think, especially soldiers. This project is the only
example of direct military cooperation [with Ecuador] in the field, and support of the EC was
crucial in this.”
In one of the summit meetings of the Presidents of Peru and Ecuador after the peace agreement
was signed, demining was discussed and collaboration in working and logistics agreed. A
further meeting to discuss demining was planned for the Defence Ministers of the two countries
for February 2008. There is thus considerable evidence that the EC funded project has
materially contributed to the broader goal of consolidating the peace.
There appears to be no available mechanism within the EC project assessment and evaluation
processes to be able to take into account both the technical value and also the strategic value of
the impact of the mine action project. Assessment for project selection does not appear to be
able to include sufficient technical expertise, whereas evaluation is frequently undertaken on
technical grounds without including sufficient appreciation of the strategic goals. The lack of
technical expertise in the existing project proposal assessment was noted in the 2005 Global
Assessment. The usual approach of the EC delegations of having subject matter specialists in
the staff is not realistic for such a small area as mine action. The project description, and
especially the evaluation of the EC “Mine Action in the Condor Mountain of Peru/Ecuador” could
have significantly benefitted from such a balanced approach.
However, it should not be forgotten that the aim is to achieve success in both strategic and
technical domains, and not simply one of the two areas.
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EC PLANS FOR ASSISTANCE TO PERU
In line with the change to the new Instruments for Cooperation in late 2006, future support for
Peru will be closely linked to the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 41 which is in turn dependent
on the National Demining Strategy. The 2002 to 2006 CSP mentions landmines on the border
with Ecuador both in section 5. 3. “EC priority areas of intervention” and also in section 3.1.4
in discussion of the “International and regional context”, in particular the war with Ecuador.
This section ends by stating “Even though the process of de-mining in that area has been
effectively monitored by the OAS in co-ordination with the Peruvian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, and some donors are already strongly involved in this activity, there still remains a
strong need for funding.”
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The landmines and UXO in the interior of the country, which have been the cause of more
accidents than those on the border, are not mentioned.
How the OAS contribution is judged to be effective when it has significantly failed to reach
even the very modest objectives of the project it designed (e.g. 197 mines cleared when the
target was 1,500 out of about 30,000 to be cleared) is not clear. 42
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The 2007 to 2013 CSP includes the need for mine action in greater detail, and also puts it in
the context of regional cooperation and security.
“Action against mines: in the 2005-07 multiannual indicative programming on EC mine
action, Peru (and also Ecuador) feature among the countries most affected by antipersonnel mines. In Peru, mines are mainly concentrated in three areas: in the north on
the border with Ecuador; on the territory inland of the Pacific coast up to the Andean
plateau; in the south on the border with Chile. By supporting a mine clearance
programme in the Peru-Ecuador cross-border area, especially in the Condor mountain
area (EC contribution €1 million), the 2005-07 strategy contributes to international
efforts to eliminate anti-personnel mines from this area along the border between Peru
and Ecuador. This type of action is very important for enhance regional
integration and confidence building.” (Emphasis added).
The assertion that Peru is a country heavily affected by landmines is inaccurate, and careful
study of the EC strategy does not support this suggestion. By any of the usual measures Peru
is not a heavily affected country. There are very few victims and the economic impact of the
mines is limited. Landmine Monitor reports just one mine victim for each of 2005 and 2006,
with 8 and 12 UXO victims respectively. This should be seen in the context of neighbouring
Colombia with about 350 civilian ERW casualties a year. Over half of the border
contamination in Peru is in uninhabited areas which are mineral mining concessions not yet
explored. The 2005-7 EC mine action strategy states as a guideline for the selection of
projects “Mine clearance should increasingly prioritise mined areas of highest impact on the
local populations”. The selection of countries for funding by the EC mine action strategy is
not based simply on a single “most affected” criterion.
The statement that there are mines inside Peru on the Chilean border is incorrect according to

H

41 There is already another significant issue arising from this approach in Peru - reconstruction aid for the victims
of the recent earthquake. Once the emergency phase of the EC response is over the funding changes from
emergency funding administered by ECHO to reconstruction funding administered by EuropeAid. However, the
earthquake was - obviously - not included in the CSP and the mechanisms and tools to be used for this type of
funding are only now being developed and tested. It is not yet entirely clear whether the instrument in its current
form will prove adequate, or if it will require a judicial decision on the interpretation of part of the Stability
Instrument to resolve this, or a minor amendment to the text of the Instrument.
42 Effectiveness: A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives. See OECD website for
further information
http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,2340,en_2649_34435_2086550_1_1_1_1,00.html
H
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all sources consulted. The problem on the border with Chile is reported as being due to mines
located in Chile affecting Peruvian people who cross the border illegally for economic
reasons.
In section 5.2 the “General Response strategy” the CSP also clearly links mine action to
security/stability concerns, and in particular to Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation
(SALW) issues.
“- maintain coherence and complementarities with European policies with an impact on
cooperation policy such as the fight against drugs, action against mines and explosive residue,
organised crime, including the fight against trafficking and illicit spread of small arms and
light weapons and the corresponding ammunition, migration, trade, people trafficking etc;”
ANALYSIS
THE OAS AICMA PROGRAMME
The OAS programme for clearance of the mined areas on the border between Peru and
Ecuador has had very substantial funding over the last eight years. A total of about 7 million
US dollars in donations has been identified, excluding significant contributions in kind and in
cash from the Peruvian and Ecuadorian governments. Even allowing for extreme access
difficulties, and the difficult nature of the terrain, the results are simply not commensurate
with this sort of expenditure and appear to give an overall clearance cost, in terms of the
actual results, of the order of hundreds of dollars per square metre 43 .
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Clearance from April to July 2006 in the border area resulted in just two mines being cleared.
Even allowing for the important difference between measuring square metres cleared and
counting mines, with an estimated 30,000 mines still to clear these figures cast doubts on the
credibility of the calculations being used to determine the time and cost of clearance for the
extension to the Ottawa deadline. Peru’s request for an extension until 2009 is based on a
calculated time from the number of demining teams and their theoretical capacity in square
metres per day. This calculation has not been based on the actual clearance rate in the last
years which is more than an order of magnitude lower.
Even if clearance could be achieved at the OAS proposed cost of 20 million dollars (which
currently seems unlikely) the question arises whether or not this is the best possible use of
such funds. At present the casualty rate due to mines is very low with just one mine victim
reported in each of 2005 and 2006. The OAS approach has apparently not been concerned
with cost efficiency, and questions need to be asked as to the value achieved for the large
expenditure. As noted above, the value to consolidating the peace process is not negligible
and should be included in any assessment.
With only 21 hectares to clear there appears to be no reason to continue investing large
amounts of money in training army deminers when there are already 80 available. Total
clearance would require each current deminer to undertake less than 3,000 square metres.
Most of the PPE used in the OAS programmes is essentially combat equipment and would be
considered as outdated and unsuitable by many specialist humanitarian demining
organisations, especially in the hot and humid border region. Short but very thick visors are
43 Worldwide, typical costs for NGO and commercial clearance operators are often in the range two to eight
dollars per square metre, depending on the threat, terrain, access etc. However, there is clear evidence from a
number of peacekeeping programmes that, when militaries undertake humanitarian demining, costs are not
unusually over US$100 per square metre.
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now uncommon for humanitarian deminers, other than those who work in OAS programmes,
ballistic jackets with full back protection and full combat helmets are being replaced by
frontal protection and lightweight long-visors mounted on light open head frames in hot
zones.
There was some criticism of the OAS programme by other key actors including the EC
delegation, AVISCAM, and the Military Deminers. The transparency of the programme is
low and the total cost of both administration and monitoring together is well over 50% of the
budget.
The most forceful criticism came from AVISCAM, the victims’ association, who regarded the
approach of supplying prostheses and rehabilitation to a small number of people as
unsatisfactory while there had still not been any national census to identify and locate mine
and UXO victims
The interface between a military organisation like the AICMA programme and the
humanitarian aid approach of the EC appears to be difficult to manage, especially in areas
such as the use of Project Cycle Management and LRRD. OAS AICMA have until now not
been able to supply the project documentation usually regarded as standard for any
organisation receiving funding from the EC.
The current added value offered by the OAS to the clearance work on the Peru Ecuador
border was apparently not clearly understood by the Peruvian Army, the initial work by the
OAS in establishing contact between the Peruvian and Ecuadoran armies had been very
important, but more recently the contribution was less clear.
The OAS approach of engaging with the armed forces, and at times the police, presents some
specific challenges. Care is required to avoid any potential difficulties regarding the
financing of armed services, even when taking a humanitarian role, from a humanitarian
budget.
POLICE DEMINING OF INFRASTRUCTURE
The lack of external support to the police demining teams clearing the electric line pylons in
training, quality assurance and equipment is a lost opportunity. The proposed budget for
finishing all infrastructure clearance is 650,000 dollars which gives a much better cost-benefit
ratio in terms of accident reduction than the border clearance. Indeed, this represents very
good value for money. The large number of accidents to police deminers (between 67 and
87) is tragic. The need to clear some pylons no fewer than three times due to poor operating
practices and poor quality management is a waste of resources. Even a modest investment in
improved training, and quality management might have resulted in very significant gains.
This once again highlights the need for EC Delegation staff to have access to mine action
expertise if they are to fund mine action.
The funding of the clearance around electric pylons by the privatised electric companies is
very unusual in Latin America and possibly worth further attention. There may well be a link
between the high cost-efficiency of the work and the use of private funding which could be
further investigated.
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FRAGMENTATION 44 OF EC MINE ACTION, ISOLATION OF EC STAFF
With just one project there is no possibility that the delegation in Peru can have a specialist in
mine action on the staff and the person responsible for the project will have very limited time
and resources for mine action amongst a large portfolio of other projects. Even at an overall
level of Latin America there is no justification of a staff post for a mine action specialist.
Except for Colombia there has been no more than one EC mine action project in any country
in Latin America.
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The CSP contains a number of minor factual errors in the section on mine action. These have
been highlighted to illustrate a specific point: it is usual for mine action projects to take a
disproportionate amount of management effort for EC staff, so it is entirely rational to accept
the risk of minor errors in order to keep the workload manageable. The evaluation team does
not wish to criticise the author of the section who was probably already trying to balance
accuracy, acquiring knowledge and a heavy workload. This is part of a more general problem
of fragmentation of mine action which is discussed in more detail in the regional report, and
the associated issue of the isolation of EC staff acting as project officers for mine action
projects. Typically, these staff will have no prior experience of mine action and just one mine
action project in their portfolio. One way to mitigate the isolation – and in turn reduce the
negative impact of fragmentation - would be improved contact between programme officers
dealing with mine action in different countries in Latin America. For example, it seems
probable that staff in Chile and Peru could have worked together to identify the issue of the
border minefields inside Chile that are affecting Peru. For the CSP, staff in Colombia would
would have noted that Peru is not heavily impacted by mines when compared to Colombia. A
further mitigation action would be to provide EC programme officers with (a) good quality
reference documentation about how to design, negotiate, manage and evaluate mine action
projects (b) expert technical support in the critical phases of contract design and evaluation.
CONCLUSIONS
Peru has well established and good quality national mine action structures.
In terms of the broader strategy of peace-building through demining, Peru presents a positive
example despite the lack of effectiveness of the clearance work on the border with Ecuador.
There is little or no mine action justification for any further funding to border clearance work
– there are very few casualties, the work is extraordinarily expensive and poor value.
However, given the impact it has had on consolidating the peace process, and its political
importance to both Ecuador and Peru, there may be strong political pressure to continue
funding. If this is the case new approaches must be taken to improve both the speed and the
cost effectiveness of the demining operation.
International assistance to the border area where there are few casualties and the cost of
clearance is very high, has not been matched by similar support to clearance within the
country where there are more casualties and much lower clearance costs. The infrastructure
clearance by the police could have benefitted very significantly from improved training and
quality management. An opportunity for a small amount of funding to produce significant
added value appears not to have been identified.

44 Fragmentation of funding is more correctly used in the area of Development to describe many donors funding
one recipient, and the EC mine action situation of one donor dispersing funding a lot of different projects is more
correctly called Proliferation. Fragmentation is used in this report as it has a clear non-technical meaning.
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The funding of the police clearance by private companies is – at least for Latin America novel and worth further study to find if the very fast low cost clearance was a result of the
funding mechanism (despite the serious quality control problems).
The EC delegation in Peru had only one mine action project so cannot be expected to have
expertise in the area. The severe fragmentation of mine action and associated isolation of EC
staff responsible for mine action projects is evident in a number of areas, including minor
errors in mine action section the CSP. These are probably unavoidable as there is no reason
for a programme officer to spend the time required to become expert in mine action for a
single project.
Mine action is fully included in the current CSP, the end of the thematic budget line for
landmine action should not affect mine action funding which can be requested as a geographic
budget item on the basis of the CSP.
Despite repeated calls from the victim association there has not yet been a nationwide survey
of mine victims. This is urgently required to move VA forwards from the current ad hoc
support to individuals to an integrated and advocacy based model.
EVALUATION CRITERIA
RELEVANCE.
The border clearance project was relevant in that it supported the consolidation of the peace
process and also provided mine clearance both to reduce the local impact of the mines and to
assist Peru in meeting its clearance obligations as a State Party to the APMBC.
The lost opportunity to work with the police demining programme could be considered as
significantly reducing the overall relevance of the programme.
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME
In terms of the peace process the programme outcome was highly effective. In terms of
demining it was ineffective.
EFFICIENCY OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME
It is difficult to quantify efficiency of support to consolidating the peace process, especially in
the absence of clear and objectively verifiable programme goals. However, the results are
very positive. The efficiency of the demining programme is extremely low, even taking into
account the very difficult terrain.
IMPACT OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME
The same remarks as efficiency apply – for the consolidation of the peace process there has
been a good impact, as indicated by repeated contacts at head of state and minister level, as
well as contact between deminers in the field from both countries. The impact of demining
the border region is very limited. The prioritisation process has maximised the limited impact
by clearing the key areas first.
SUSTAINABILITY OF THE OVERALL PROGRAMME
Once again this is mixed. There are some very good and sustainable results in the peace
process. The demining is heavily dependent on donor aid and completely unsustainable.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The EC delegation in Peru should consider in the next review of the CSP:
1.1 If it is not already completed, including the infrastructure demining being
undertaken in Peru as an activity which could benefit from donor support to: training, quality
management, and equipment. Whether or not clearance is complete, support for establishing
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a long-term capacity within the police to deal with residual ERW on a permanent basis could
be a useful and cost-effective project and is recommended.
1.2 Any further support for mine clearance on the Peru-Ecuador border through the
OAS can only be on the basis as a contribution to peace consolidation. As a demining activity
it is not cost effective and has low impact. See also recommendation 3 below.
1.3 Including the urgent need for a national census of mine and UXO deaths and
survivors in order to establish a basis for Victim Support. Support for such an action is
recommended.
1.4 Including the need for MRE in settlements in Peru near the border with Chile
which is mined on the Chilean side.
1.5 Addressing the minor inaccuracies about humanitarian demining in the CSP
which are identified in this report.
2.
The EC delegation in Peru should urgently consider increased contact with EC
delegations in neighbouring mine-affected countries to generate and maintain synergies. One
example is coordinating with Chile regarding the border minefield in Chile’s territory which
causes Peruvian casualties. Regional, or even sub-regional contact - even if occasional and at
an informal level - between EuropeAid staff (and, if relevant ECHO staff) who are directly
responsible for projects, could make a real difference to the issue of fragmentation.
3. In the event that further support for border mine clearance on the Peru-Ecuador border
becomes a political imperative then:
3.1. In the likely event that border clearance is maintained as a monopoly of the army, make
every effort to obtain a more realistic price per square metre, very substantially less than 40
dollars.
3.2.Insist on payment being made only against independently certified performance of
clearance, on the basis of payment per square metre completed.
3.3. Insist of full implementation of Project Cycle Management in accordance with EC
guidelines.
3.4. Insist on full implementation of the EC policy on LRRD.
3.5.Seek alternatives to the OAS multi-donor programme which appears to have very high
overheads and limited added value.
3.6. Use independent specialist technical advice when negotiating a clearance contract.
4. If a further commitment to mine action is envisaged, maintain the existing working
relationships with CONTRAMINAS, OAS (regional level) and AICMA (national level).
Further build the relationship with AVISCAM (victims’ association) and the National Police
demining structures.
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ANNEX 1 TERMS OF REFERENCE

Regional evaluation of EC-funded mine actions in Latin America
2002-2007
1. BACKGROUND
In 2001 the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament adopted two Regulations on
the reinforcement of the EU response against Antipersonnel Landmines (APL). 45 These
(referred to collectively as “the Regulation”) laid the foundation of the European integrated
and focused policy.
TPF

FPT

Article 13, paragraph 1 of the EC Regulation states that: The Commission shall regularly
assess operations financed by the Community in order to establish whether the objectives of
the operations have been achieved and to provide guidelines for improving the effectiveness
of future operations.
The APL Regulation goes on to state: Every three years after entry into force of this
Regulation, the Commission shall submit to the European Parliament an overall assessment
of all Community mine actions… (Article 14)
The EC Mine Action Strategy and Multi-annual Indicative Programme, 2005-2007 46 further
specifies that “more specific, geographic, evaluations of EC-funded mine actions, analysing
the results and their impact” will be undertaken to complement the overall assessment.
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To implement these provisions, the EC:
1. Commissioned a global assessment of EC mine policy and actions over the period 20022004;
2. Entered into an agreement with The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) to, inter alia, manage the programme of regional evaluations to
identify lessons learned within EC-funded mine action projects in the following
regions: 47
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• Africa
• Asia-Pacific

• Caucasus-Central Asia
• Europe

• Latin America
• Middle East

The Report from the Global Assessment was issued in March 2005, 48 while the agreement
with the GICHD was concluded in December that year.
TPF

FPT

45

Regulation (EC) 1724/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001
concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in developing countries (OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.1)
and Regulation (EC) 1725/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2001
concerning action against anti-personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries
(OJ L 234, 1.9.2001, p.6). The provisions are similar and we quote from Regulation (EC) 1724/2001.
46
This is the second strategy and multi-year indicative programme since the adoption of the EC
Regulation: the first covered the period 2002-04.
47
Additional objectives of the EC-GICHD Agreement are to:
• provide a repository and dissemination service for reports from mine action evaluations and
similar studies;
• train people from mine affected countries in evaluation;
• support the participation of key players from mine-affected countries in official meetings
relating to the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT).
48
Gasser, Russell and Robert Keeley, Global Assessment of EC Mine Policy and Actions: 2002-2004.
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2. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVALUATION
The general objective of the Global Assessment was to determine to what extent the
objectives and means set in the APL Regulation had been complied with and used in terms of
strategy, programming, commitments and implementation. The regional evaluations will
complement the Global Assessment by focusing on (i) relevant conclusions and
recommendations from the Global Assessment, and (ii) EC mine action strategy and
programming issues at the country level. Thus, the evaluation will not assess the efficiency,
effectiveness, and impact of individual projects, except to illustrate changes since the Global
Assessment or critical programming issues.
Overall objective:
To provide systematic and objective assessments of EC-funded mine actions in Latin America
to generate credible and useful lessons for decision-makers within the EC, allowing them to
improve the planning and management of existing and future mine action projects,
programmes, and policies.
Specific objectives:
− To assess the relevance of EC-funded mine activities vis-à-vis:
o the geographic and thematic priorities defined in the Strategies for 2002-2004 and
2005-2007;
o national and regional needs, strategies, and priorities;
o EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes for mine-affected
countries in Latin America 2002-2006;
o EC strategy documents for Latin America or major sub-regions in Latin America.
− To analyse the allocation of EC funds among mine-affected states in Latin America, and
across the various components of mine action (survey, clearance, MRE, etc.);
− To assess the effectiveness of EC-funded mine action support in:
o addressing the landmine & UXO problems in mine-affected partner countries
o fostering national ownership and the development of local capacities;
o supporting the overall development and rehabilitation priorities/ programmes of the
beneficiary countries;
o supporting local mine action organisations;
− To assess the coordination among the EC and other agencies supporting mine action in a
country (national; UN; OAS, donors; international NGOs; etc.);
− To assess the role & performance of multilateral agencies active in the national mine
action programme (e.g. Inter-American Defence Board/OAS, UN agencies, etc.);
− To assess the impact of deconcentration on the planning and delivery of EC support to
mine action in Latin America, including the capacity of EC delegations to assess
proposals for mine action projects and to monitor/evaluate the implementation of these
projects;
− To asses the adequacy of the EC national strategies and plans, and the effectiveness of
implementation;
− To assess the existence of an ‘exit strategy’ for the country to graduate from donor
assistance (including plans for sustainability);
− To assess the linkages between mine action and other issues, such as humanitarian
assistance, development, and armed violence reduction
− To assess the impact of the end of the specific budget line for anti-personnel landmines
and the introduction of the new “stability instrument” on future mine action support from
the EC to Latin America;
− To make recommendations to improve the identification, design, and implementation of
EC-funded mine projects;
− To generate recommendations to enhance the opportunities for cross-fertilisation among
mine action programmes in Latin America and globally.
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Expected results
The evaluation report shall give an overview of EC mine action support to Latin America, and
to particular mine-affected countries in Latin America, since 2002. It shall incorporate more
detailed assessments of EC mine action support in a limited number of ‘focus country’ cases
to illustrate and support its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Recommendations
will aim in particular to guide EC personnel in designing and implementing programmes of
support to mine action that complement the actions of other actors, including national
authorities, other donors, and UN agencies for the next years.
3. METHODOLOGY
The evaluation shall entail the following main components of work:
− Preliminary Planning & Data Collection (now underway)
− Desk Research
− Country Missions (to be confirmed)
o Colombia
o Peru/Ecuador 49
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− Analysis and Reporting
Country Missions
As the evaluation will not focus on the performance of individual projects, Evaluation Team
members will spend most or all of their time in capitals and major centres to meet with and
collect documents and data from:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

EC delegations
national authorities and officials from national mine action centres
UN agencies supporting mine action
representatives from other major donors to mine action in that country
representatives from mine action operators (local and international)
other key government officials
representatives from key regional organisation (where present).

Additional data collection
Additional information will be obtained from:
−
−
−

−

Review of project documents (project proposals and contracts; mid-term and final
reports, as well as final evaluations, monitoring reports, audit reports, etc., where
available;
Interviews with relevant Commission officials (in Brussels);
Questionnaire surveys and some follow-up telephone interviews with project
managers/implementers/recipients of EC funds and projects (Officials in other EC
Delegations, managers of operator organisations, both in organisations’ headquarters and
on the field, and beneficiary countries’ officials, etc.).
EC Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes.

P
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Relating to the cross-border project Mine Action in the Condor Mountain Range of Peru/ Ecuador,
approved in 2005.
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−
−

National Development Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and National Mine
Action Strategies from the focus countries
Relevant reports from the UN (including inter-agency assessment mission reports for
mine action) and the World Bank
Recent mine action evaluations commissioned by other agencies
Other sources, as appropriate.

−
−

4. OUTPUTS
An evaluation work plan will be prepared and distributed following the preliminary planning
and data collection stage (late October 2007).
A debriefing of preliminary findings and conclusions will be provided to EC officials and
other stakeholders at the end of each country mission.
Within one month of the end of the country missions, a draft report will be prepared and
distributed to the GICHD and EC delegations for comments, and subsequently distributed to
other stakeholders. For both comments the deadline is two weeks.
A final report will be submitted to the GICHD and EC Brussels.
All reports will be in English, with the final Executive Summary translated into Spanish as
well.
All reports will clearly indicate on the cover page that the evaluation was financed by the
European Union and managed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD). The reports should display the logos of both the EU and the GICHD. 50
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http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/visibility/index_en.htm. The GICHD logo shall be provided by
the GICHD.
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Annex 1
Among the key conclusions of the Global Assessment were:
•
•
•

•

•

The need for a transparent process for determining which countries and projects will
receive EC funding for mine action;
In light of ‘deconcentration’, the need to clarify “who does what” in mine action
within the EC;
Request for proposal and selection processes, including:
• The need for more high quality proposals,
• The need to reduce the number of proposals rejected on technicalities, and
• The need for more rigorous assessments – including technical criteria – of
proposals and projects.
Contracting issues, including:
• The need for greater contractual rigour in specifying performance requirements;
• The need for greater clarity in defining the chains of responsibility and authority;
• The limitations inherent in the use of non-renewable contracts issued for short
durations.
All interventions should incorporate exit strategies.
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ANNEX 2 ORGANISATIONS CONTACTED IN COLOMBIA
Organización en Español

Organisation in English

Person

Campaña Columbiana Contra
Minas CCCM

Colombian Campaign to Ban
Landmines

Alvaro Jiménez Millan, National
Coordinator

Centro Integral de
Rehabilitación de Colombia
CIREC - programa “Semillas de
Esperanza”

Integral Rehabilitation Centre of
Colombia, “Seeds of Hope”
Victim Assistance programme.

German Ruiz Z, Director.
Four members of “Semillas”
team.

Delegación de la Comisión
Europea, EuropeAid.

European Commission
Delegation, EuropeAid

Thierry Dudermel, Head of Trade
section,
Manuel de Rivera Lamo,
Cooperation Specialist.

Delegación de la Comisión
Europea,ECHO.

European Commission
Delegation, ECHO.

Natalia Cepeda, Programme
Assistant
Marie Zazvorkova, Programme
Assistant

Programa Presidencial para la
Acción Integral contra las Minas
Antipersonal

Presidential Programme for
Integated Action against AP
Mines

Andrés Dávila, Director
Katerina Patón, Programme
Director

Secretariado Nacional de la
Pastora Social

National Administration of
“Pastoral Social” (Caritas
International)

Mnsr Héctor Fabio Henao
Camilo Serna
Irma González,
Natalia Velasquez

AICMA/OEA Programa de
Acción Integral Conra las Minas
Antipersonal

OAS Integrated Mine
Action Program, Regional Office

Guillermo Leal, Coordinador
Regional para Sur America

UNICEF

UNICEF

Sharon Ball, Mine Action Officer

Organización en Español

Organisation in English

Person

Following contacts by phone
and e-mail:
Comité Internacional de la Cruz
Roja, Colombia

International Committee of the
Red Cross, Colombia

Andy Wheatley

PNUD

UNDP

Alessandro Preti, Programme
Coordinator

Embajada de Gran Bretaña,
Bogota

British Embassy, Bogota

Oriel Willox, Attache
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Organización en Español
Delegación de la Comision
Europea en Chile, EuropeAid

Organisation in English

Person

European Commission delegation
in Chile, EuropeAid

Soledad Suárez G.
Sección Cooperación

Delegación de la Comision
Europea en Nicaragua,
EuropeAid

European Commission delegation
in Nicaragua, EuropeAid

Pilar Suárez, Cooperation
Specialist, and other staff.

Delegación de la Comision
Europea en Nicaragua, ECHO

European Commission delegation
in Nicaragua, ECHO

Peter Burgess, Head of ECHO
office.

Following meeting additional to
the original work plan.
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ANNEX 3 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO MINE ACTION IN COLOMBIA
From

To Implementer

2002
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2004

Donor

Actual amount
USA dollars
$3,300,000

Government of Colombia
2004 OAS
2004 CCCM
2004 CCCM
Geneva Call
GICHD (MRE)
2004 UNICEF (MRE, VA, Advocacy)
Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco - MRE

2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004

CIREC - advocacy
OAS (Demining, VA, MRE)
UNICEF - MRE
National Antimine Programme
Antipersonnel mine Observatory
Antipersonnel mine Observatory
CIREC
Corporación Paz y Democracia - MRE

2004
2004
2004

OAS (Demining, VA, MRE)
Colombian Red Cross
UNDP- Antioquiía training

Canada
CCCM own funds
Int Org for Migration
Int Org for Migration and USAID
Plan Colombia
EC
Switzerland

Total for year
$3,300,000

$115,000
$26,546
$116,000
$98,448
$12,000
$237,000
$50,000
$428,063

TOTAL FOR 2003
“Children of the Andes,” the Diana, Princess of Wales
Fund & own resources
Antioquía Health Dept
Canada
Canada
Canada
EC
Government of Colombia
Int Org for Migration
Int Org for Migration and others
ISAGEN (Electricity Generating Company of
Colombia)
Italy
Not known
Not known

$1,083,057
$120,000
$17,392
$47,822
$178,169
$192,057
$3,109,500
$863,000
$116,267
$140,000
$21,927
$19,335
$25,000
$7,827
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2004

Antipersonnel mine Observatory -earmarked for Meta, Antioqía, Not known, via UNDP
Montes de María regions

$50,000

2004

Corporación Paz y Democracia - Mine Action plans

Not known, via UNICEF

$99,299

2004

Antipersonnel mine Observatory, GICHD (MRE)

Switzerland

$123,200

2004

Antipersonnel mine Observatory, GICHD (MRE)

Switzerland

110000

2004
2004
2005

OAS - Bogota office

$75,000

Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco - MRE

2005
2005
2005
2005
2005

Not known - MRE
OAS AICMA - technical survey
UNICEF - MRE
Diakonie - MRE
Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco - MRE

US State Dept
TOTAL FOR 2004
"Children of the Andes", Diana Proncess of Wales
foundation
Adopt a Minefield
Canada
Canada
EC
EC

$84,215
$132,893
$206,356
$25,554
$99,658

2005
2005
2005

UNICEF - MRE and VA
National Antimine Programme
Hogar Jesús de Nazareth, Bucaramanga - VA

Germany
Government of Colombia
Int Org for Migration

$174,032
$934,100
$42,757

2005

Hospital Universitario del Valle Evaristo García - rehabilitation
centre
CCCM - MRE and VA
Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco - MRE

Japan via Int Org for Migration

$656,496

Norway
Norway

$333,323
$9,980

Not known, via UNDP & UNICEF
Own funds

$22,174
$187,976

2005
2005
2005
2005

Antioquía - Mine Actionplans
Hospital Universitario del Valle Evaristo García - rehabilitation
centre

$5,315,795
$174,135
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2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005

Not known - VA
UNICEF - MRE
Not known - MRE
UNICEF - VA
UNICEF - MRE
Landmine Survivors Network
Hospital Universitario del Valle Evaristo García - rehabilitation
centre

2005
2006

Handicap International - capacity building

2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

OAS
UNICEF - MRE and VA
CARITAS - Pastoral Social
HI - victim assistance
Regional Govt of Antioquía
National Antimine Programme
OAS (Demining)
Not known
UNICEF - MRE and VA
UNICEF and others
CIREC - victim assistance
OAS capacity building

Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Switzerland
UK
USA
Valle de Cauca departmental government
TOTAL FOR 2005
Canada
Canada
Canada
EC
EC
EC
Government of Colombia
Italy
Slovenia
Spain
Switzerland
USA
USA
TOTAL FOR 2006
TOTAL 2002 to 2006

$267,653
$125,000
$120,395
$140,461
$135,000
$177,311
$127,544
$4,177,013
$123,452
$420,090
$220,450
$847,800
$1,004,800
$659,400
$213,400
$11,720
$22,100
$376,890
$279,300
$70,000
$300,000
$4,549,402
$18,425,267
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ANNEX 4 LIST OF EC CO-FINANCED MINE ACTION PROJECTS IN COLOMBIA 2002-2007
Contract
number

Country

MAP/2003/074 Colombia
-967 EC
and Middle
East
MAP/2004/088 Worldwide
-125 DE

DDH/2004/097 Colombia
-944

ALA/2006/132- Colombia
419

Contract Title

Contractor’s End date of Contracting Party Amount of
Notes
signature
activities
EC
date or start
cofunding
date of
activities
Engaging armed non-state
02/12/2003 01/12/2005 Geneva Call
250,000 € Total budget was 500,000 € - assumed
actors (NSAs) in a landmine
50% spent on each of Colombia and
ban: Colombia and the Middle
the Middle East,
East
International Campaign to Ban 01/09/2004 30/09/2005 International
5,000 €
Total budget was 500,000€, Very
Landmines: activities proposal
Campaign to Ban
difficult to identify the small part
1-9-04 to 30-9-05 including
Landmines Asbl
relevant to Latin America, estimated at
Landmine Monitor Initiative
10,000€ (2% of total)
MRE “Estrategia de
01/02/2005 01/02/2006 Fundacion
Antonio 59,799 €
Comunicación para la
Restrepo Barco
prevención de accidentes por
minas antipersonales y
artefactos explosivos
abandonados con y para niños,
niñas y jóvenes"
Institutional Strengthening of 01/01/2006 26/12/2010 Departamento
2,500,000 €
the Colombian National Mines
Administrativo
Action Capacity
Presidencia de la
Republica, Programa
Presidencial de
Acción Integral contra
las Minas
Antipersonal DAPRPPAICMA
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Contract
number

Country

ECHO/Colombia
SM/BUD/2006/
01005

ECHO/SM/BU Colombia
D/2006/01016

MAP/2007/143 Colombia
-289

MAP/2007/143 Colombia
-269

Contract Title

Contractor’s End date of Contracting Party Amount of
Notes
signature
activities
EC
date or start
cofunding
date of
activities
Our future is today III: Re01/03/2006 Feb 07
Diakonisches Werk
28,113 € Reported as 100,580 in EC “Mine
integration in the educational
der EKD - Diakonie
Action in the World” report,
system and increased protection
Katastrophenhilfe
against mines and UXO’s
Germany 682,000 €
total of which 28,113
€ for Mine Action
Access and Humanitarian Aid 01/07/2006 Jun 07
Solidaridad
1,001 €
for populations putting up
Internacional 600,000
resistance, those that have
€ total of which 1001
returned and those displaced, in
€ for Mine Action
the municipalities most affected
by the conflict and the
displacement in the
departments of Valle del Cauca
and Nariño,
MRE “Educación en el riesgo 01/10/2007
Deutscher
675,000 €
(ERM) de la población
Caritasverband e,V,
vulnerable y Atención a las
(Caritas Germany)
víctimas de minas antipersonal
y municiones sin explotar en el
sur de Colombia”
VA “Asistencia a víctimas
01/12/2007
HI Belgium
800,000 €
civiles de accidentes de Minas
Antipersonal y Municiones Sin
Explotar (MAP y MUSE) en
Colombia”
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Contract
number

Country

Contract Title

MAP/2007/144 Colombia MRE in Antioquía
-541
“Institucionalización y
sostenibilidad de la educación
riesgo de minas y la atención
biopsicosocial a víctimas de
MAP y MUSE, a través de
educadores y personal de salud
en municipios prioritarios del
Departamento de Antioquia”

Contractor’s End date of Contracting Party Amount of
signature
activities
EC
date or start
cofunding
date of
activities
01/12/2007
Antioquía Local
525,000 €
Government

Notes

EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE PROJECTS (ECHO) STARTING IN 2007 IN COLOMBIA WITH IDENTIFIED COMPONENTS OF
MRE AND OTHER MINE ACTION, NO SEPARATE FINANCIAL DATA FOR THE MINE ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE
GENERALLY IN SUPPPORT OF THE MAIN AIMS OF THE PROJECT, All projects end in 2008 after the end of evaluation period,
Contract
Country
Contract Title
Start date End date of Contracting Party Amount of
Description
number
activities
EC
cofunding
ECHO/Colombia To provide protection, relief
Apr,07
Feb,08
Movimiento por la
Multisectorial project with a mine risk
SM/BUD/2007/ (ECHO)
and assistance to people
Paz el Desarme y la
education component (under R6):
01006
affected by the internal conflict
Libertad (MPDL)
Workshops on antipersonnel mines
in Colombia in the rural and
and UXO for IDP families and
urban areas located close to the
tranings of communitarian Mine Risk
border with Venezuela, in the
Education multipliers
Cesar departments,
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Contract
number

Country

Contract Title

Contractor’s End date of Contracting Party Amount of
Notes
signature
activities
EC
date or start
cofunding
date of
activities
ECHO/Colombia ICRC assistance and protection Feb,07
Jan,08
International
The component of economic support
SM/BUD/2007/ (ECHO)
activities
Committee of the Red
for residents (R3) contains provision
01007
Cross
of food assistance up to three months
and EHI on a one-time basis for 100
families of the missing or affected by
land mines,
ECHO/Colombia Amélioration de l’attention
Jul,07
Jun,08
Croix-Rouge
The project focused at providing
SM/BUD/2007/ (ECHO)
médicale portée aux
Française
health assistance has also a component
01011
populations vulnérables
of mine risk education and awareness
d’Arauquita, dont en
(R2): Formation de leaders
particulier, celle du service de
communautaires dans chaque point
santé publique,
d’attention sur la thématique des
mines durant 3 jours, avec distribution
du matériel didactique, Réalisation de
10 ateliers sur les mines pour les
populations infantiles et adultes avec
une distribution de matériel didactique
ECHO/Colombia Humanitarian assistance to
Jul,07
SM/BUD/2007/ (ECHO)
isolated or blocked rural
01013
communities, populations at
risk of displacement and other
population directly affected by
the armed conflict in the
Municipalities of Remedios and
Zaragoza, Department of
Antioquia, Colombia,

Jun,08

Spanish Red Cross

This project focused on providing
health assistance has also a component
of mine risk education and awareness
(R2): talks on antipersonnel mines for
children and adult population in each
of four focal communities
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Contract
number

Country

Contract Title

ECHO/Colombia Access and humanitarian aid
SM/BUD/2007/ (ECHO)
for populations putting up
01014
resistance, those that have
returned and are displaced, in
the territories of ethnic
communities most affected by
the armed conflict in Valle del
Cauca and Nariño

Contractor’s End date of Contracting Party
signature
activities
date or start
date of
activities
Jul,07
Jun,08
Solidaridad
Internacional

ECHO/Colombia Our future is today: Protection Mär,07
SM/BUD/2007/ (ECHO)
of Indigenous Populations and
01001
Children

Feb,08

Amount of
EC
cofunding

Notes

Multisectorial project with a
component of institutional and
community strenghtening (R1 and R5)
that will contain specific activities (to
be defined by the indigenous
communities in the next weeks) such
as sensitation events regarding risk
related with landmines and/or
development of contingency plans in
case of landmine accidents in Nariño
department,

Diakonisches Werk
der EKD - Diakonie
Katastrophenhilfe,
Germany
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ECHO/Colombia Provision of coordination
SM/BUD/2007/ (ECHO)
services for humanitarian
01020
response in Colombia

Mär,07

Feb,08

ECHO/Colombia Improving humanitarian
SM/BUD/2007/ (ECHO)
protection of communities
?
living in the midst of the
conflict,

Okt,07

Jun,08

UN Office for the
Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs
OCHA
OXFAM GB

Among its coordination and
information activities, OCHA also
collects and disseminates information
related to landmines
Multisectorial project with a capacity
strengthening component that contains
actions to improve the information and
communication relating to the routes
for treatment of populations affected
by landmines, among others (R2)*,
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ANNEX 5 ORGANISATIONS CONTACTED IN PERU
Oraganización en Español

Organisation in English

Person(s)

Asociación de Victimas y
Sobrevivientes de Campos
Minados AVISCAM

Association of Victims and
Survivors of Minefields

Carlos Estrada, President

Centro Peruano de Acción contra
las Minas Antipersonal
CONTRAMINAS

Peruvian Centre for Action
against Antipersonnel Mines.

Dr Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga,
Coordinador General.

Cancillería de Perú

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ministra Consejera Liliam Ballón
Peru
represented by Juan Pablo Guerrero,
Second Secretary

AICMA/OEA Programa de Acción OAS Integrated Mine Action
Integral Conra las Minas
Program, Regional Office
Antipersonal

Guillermo Leal, Coordinador
Regional para Sur America

AICMA/OEA Perú

OAS Integrated Mine Action
Program in Peru

Giselle Vasquez, Administrator

Delegación de la Comisión
Europea en Perú

EC Delegation in Peru

Leonor Suárez Ognio,
Development Cooperation.
Jean_Charles Fiehrer, Head
of Section, Development Cooperation.
Karl-Heinz Vogel,
Cooperation Attaché

DirecciónGeneral de Desminado
Humanitario del Ejército del Perú

Peruvian Army Humanitarian
Demining Command

General de Brigada Juan
Méndiz.Mayor David Fernández

Policía Nacional, División de
Seguridad Contraminas
DIVSECOM

National Police Division for
Not possible to arrange meeting at
Antimine Safety DIVSECOM suitable time.
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